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The purpose of this thesis is to describe the history of the "Irish
question" and the role of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
in attaining peace in the region. This thesis reviews both the
Catholic and Protestant positions.
The Protestant population believes that the current wave of violence
was caused by Catholic support for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association and the PIRA. Catholics, on the other hand, believe that
discrimination against Catholics by Protestants and the government is
a significant factor in explaining the violence.
Specifically, this study examines the role that the PIRA has carved
for itself in the resolution of the Catholic perception of the problem
of discrimination. The argument is made that terrorism is counter
productive in the elimination of discrimination in Northern Ireland
because it promotes Protestant and government stereotypes of Catholic
distrust and disloyalty. Further, the PIRA will be unable to attain
its primary goal of a united Ireland governed solely by an Irish
Parliament because its officials are unable to negotiate with the
British government.
The troubles in Ireland have been ongoing for 800 years. An
historical approach, encompassing the years 1858 to present, was
taken because it is nearly impossible to understand the current
situation without first reviewing the historical factors. This method
allows one to trace the rise and fall of the various paramilitary
groups and the coinciding violence and social change.
The PIRA is the main focus of the thesis and is therefore studied
at length. Its tactical and strategic goals are highlighted as well
as its targets, internal machinery, organization and supporters.
Perceived discrimination of Catholics by Protestants in Northern
Ireland from 1968 is also studied. It encompasses discrimination in
the areas of housing, employment, income, and education.
It is argued
that these were legitimate concerns at one time, however due to social
change there is presently very little housing discrimination and no
education discrimination.
In conclusion, the Provisional Irish Republican Army is working
against the goal of equality for Catholics by perpetuating hostility
in Protestants and the British government, and eliminating the
possibility for peaceful negotiations.
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WE SAW A VISION
In the darkness of despair we saw a vision. We lit the
light of hope. And it was not extinguished. In the desert
of discouragement we saw a vision. We planted the tree of
valour. And it blossomed.
In the winter of bondage we saw a vision. We melted the
snow of lethargy. And the river of resurrection flowed from
it.
We sent our vision aswim like a swan on the river. The
vision became a reality. Winter became summer. Bondage
became freedom. And this we left to you as your
inheritance.
0 generations of freedom remember us, the generations of the
vision.
Author unknown
Copied from a plaque at the
Garden of Rememberance,
Dublin, Ireland
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the history
of the "Irish Question" and the role of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in eliminating discrimination
in Northern Ireland.

The Protestant population believes

that violence is caused not by discrimination against
Catholics, but by Catholic support for the Northern Ireland
Civil Rights Association in the late 1960s, and the
Provisional IRA presently.

Catholics, on the other hand,

believe that discrimination against Catholics is a
significant factor in explaining the violence.
Specifically, this study will examine the role that the
Provisional IRA had carved for itself in the resolution of
discrimination against Catholics.

The argument will be made

that terrorism is counter-productive in the elimination of
discrimination in Ulster (Northern Ireland) because it
promotes hostility in Protestants and perpetuates their
stereotyped images of the disloyal and untrustworthy
Catholic.

Further, the PIRA will be unable to attain their

primary goals of a united Ireland governed solely by an
Irish Parliament.

1

2

The intent of the IRA in 1969 was a non-violent protest
against the occupation of Northern Ireland and the perceived
discrimination against Catholics in the areas of housing,
jobs, income, and, to a degree, education.

It was a

campaign of nonsectarian and non-violent political education
and activism.1

But when these non-violent protests led to

violent clashes with police and Protestant counterdemonstrators, a split within the IRA occurred, and the
Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged.
Arguments have been made that the strife is directly
related to religious discrimination against Catholics by
Protestants and the Protestant-run government.

Padraig

O'Malley, a respected scholar on Irish affairs, states that
the Ulster government, in response to the threat of external
attack and internal insurrection, "demanded that all
Catholics be viewed as subversive."2

Furthermore, any

political compromise with Catholics was seen as politically
dangerous to Protestant hegemony.

Mark Findlay, in

"Criminalization and the Detention of Political Prisoners,"
maintains that social discrepancies, "economic deprivation,
discrimination in the provision of housing and employment as
well as unbalanced and unrepresentative political
representation, are at the heart of the [troubles]."3
Thomas E. Hachey, a history professor at Marquette
University, proposes that the PIRA was born from this
discrimination.

"From the Provo (PIRA) perspective," he
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states, "the British government turned a deaf ear and a
blind eye to the outrages and abuses of the Northern Ireland
Storemont government for the roughly fifty years of its
existence."4

Protestant Unionist groups terrorized the

Catholic minority at will and routinely denied them their
civil rights.

The passive resistance of Catholics was

easily replaced in the early 1970s by terrorist tactics
because "an increasing number of Catholics saw violence as
their only means of obtaining victory."5
Richard Clutterbuck, in Guerrillas and Terrorists,
maintains however, that families living in Catholic ghettos
in Northern Ireland "are becoming exasperated with the
continual involvement of their children in the fighting, and
it is probable that less than one third support the IRA."6
In addition, "the violence of the PIRA has succeeded only in
alienat[ing] their own Catholic supporters in the North."7
Further, "the only reunification which the IRA has achieved
has been to bring about unprecedented unity between London
and Dublin."8
Until discrimination in Northern Ireland can be
eliminated there will be little movement toward peace in the
region.

Some scholars believe that even if discrimination

is eradicated, the PIRA will not move toward peace.
The Role of Religion
The misconception held most often about the troubles in
Northern Ireland is that it is one of religion.

Reverend

4

Paul Badham, a theologian at St. David's University College
in Lempeter, England, asserts that Catholics and Protestants
remain estranged due to their wholly separate lifestyles.
They attend different schools which promote a separate
ethos; participate in different sports and cultural activi
ties; support different political parties; attend different
churches; and are strongly opposed to intermarriage.3

After

much consideration, Badham concludes that "the contribution
of religion to the continuation of the divisions in Northern
Ireland would appear to be very considerable."4

Further,

if we then take note of the part played by explicitly
sectarian leaders to frustrate the cautious attempts
made by more liberal leaders to lessen the cultural
apartheid of Northern Ireland, we can see that religion
is a major factor in the current troubles.5
Badham is correct when he argues that the contribution
of religion is important in the region.

The lives of all

individuals revolve in some way around the denomination to
which they belong.

However, Badham overlooks the difference

between religious affiliation and religious belief and tends
to encompass the two in the term "religion."

All the

factors he describes can be associated with religious
affiliation, not religious belief.

The churches have

themselves denied that the conflict is in any way doctrinal.
Ian McAllister states that in 1973 the four main churches in
Ulster published a joint letter contending that "the

.
.
.
.
.
conflict rfc, not primarily religious in character.

It is

based rather on political and social issues with deep

5

historical roots."6

McAllister claims that if religinri_.is_

to_be considered a significant factor, then "religious
be1ief _shouId bepositively correlated with the strength of
po1 it i.ca 1 views."7
McAllister studies several factors to measure religious
commitment:

ritual, the frequency of church attendance and

communion; belief in the supernatural, the extent to which
the individual subscribes to fundamental religious values;
and devotion, religious importance and self-definition.

It

was discovered that Catholics in Northern Ireland attend
church more often than Catholics in any other country except
the Republic of Ireland.

The supernatural dimension showed

that Catholics more readily accept the notions of
supernatural belief than Protestants.

Although

fundamentalist Protestants can be distinguished from the
more liberal Presbyterians and Methodists.8
McAllister next examines religious commitment and
social structure.

Age, education, occupation, and location

of home are correlated to study the link between social
structure and religion.

In both denominations, attendance

declines after the age of 60; however, devotion grows
consistently stronger.

Persons with more education will

conform to the group norms of religious behavior, however
belief in the supernatural tends to decline, because of its
liberalizing influence.

6

In both denominations, residing in an urban environment
made it less likely for both religions to participate in
ritual, but it did not diminish the other aspects of
religion.9

"Clearly," McAllister states, "religious

commitment is to some extent determined by social
structure.1,10
The final variable in McAllister's study is religious
commitment and political conflict.

The author polled

individuals from each denomination, asking them what caused
the conflict.

The results suggest.that Catholics related

the^troubles to government policies while Protestants blamed
the IRA.
Table 1.— Catholic and Protestant Interpretations of the
causes of the Conflict in Northern Ireland.
Catholic causes of the conflict:
1. Discrimination over housing
2. Lack of job opportunities for Catholics because
Protestants are given preference
3. Influence of the Orange order
4. Existence of the Special Powers Act
5. Activity of the Ulster Volunteer Force
6. Internment.
Protestant causes of the conflict:
1. Activity of the Irish Republican Army
2. Catholic disloyalty to the United Kingdom
3. Labour Party's failure to stop the growth of the
IRA when they had a chance in 1969
4. Dublin government failed to stop the IRA operating
from across the border.
Source: Ian McAllister, "The Devil, Miracles and the
Afterlife: The Political Sociology of Religion in Northern
Ireland," The British Journal of Sociology 33 (September
1982): 340, table 4.
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McAllister concludes that "religious commitment is only
/weakly related to political attitudes for Protestants, and
i
\unrelated for Catholics."12 The strength of religious
behavior, devotion and belief, does not influence the
strength of political attitudes.

Therefore, the lines which

divide the Northern Ireland community and perpetuate the
conflict are related not to religious belief, but religious
affiliation.

Paul Badham1s claim that religion is important

is deceiving because he does not differentiate between
belief and affiliation.

It is clear that religious

affiliation is a major contributor to the ongoing strife in
the region, and religious belief plays a very small role.
The roots of the conflict are very complex.
political, social, and historical.

They are

An historical approach

to the study of the troubles encompasses these concepts and
can best relate the ideas of yesterday as they apply today.

8
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TROUBLES
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) had warned the English
government about pending terrorist attacks to mark the 20th
anniversary of the British military presence in Northern
Ireland.

On the morning of September 22, 1989, at exactly

8:26, an explosion ripped through the Royal Marines Barracks
at the Royal Marines School of Music in Deal, England.

Ten

people died and twenty-two were injured, eight seriously.
The Times reports that "most of those hurt suffered chest
injuries, fractures, facial cuts, and burns.

Many had been

pulled from the rubble."1
In what has been called one of the worst atrocities in
Britain, the IRA, "using Czechoslovakian-made material ten
times more powerful than normal commercial explosives,"
detonated a fifty pound bomb at North barracks.2

In a full

statement IRA guerrillas said,
Mrs. Thatcher visited occupied Ireland with a message
of war at a time when we want peace [referring to the
Prime Minister's visit to Northern Ireland one week
earlier]. Now we, in turn, have visited the Royal
Marines in Kent. But we still want peace and we want
the British Government to leave our country.3
Danny Morrison, an official of Sinn Fein, the IRA's
political wing said, "that further deaths could be avoided
10

11

if the Government changed its colonial policy on Ireland and
agreed to peace talks with the guerrillas."4

In response,

Margaret Thatcher vowed "that the IRA's terrorism campaign
to force British troops out of Northern Ireland would never
succeed."5
The violence escalates.

A never-ending battle of

guerrilla warfare, terrorism, unlawful executions and long
prison sentences.

How did this battle begin?

More

importantly, why is it still being fought today?

This

chapter reviews the history of the Irish Republican Army,
beginning with the formation of the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB) on St. Patrick's Day, March 17, 1858, and
ending with the bombing of the Royal Marines School of
music, on September 22, 1989.
The Protestants of Ulster came to Ireland from
urbanized Scotland and England under the direction of King
William III in the late 1600s.

Ireland at that time was a

Gaelic, Catholic, agrarian society which was deeply rooted
in tradition.

The newly settled people in Ireland viewed

Catholics with contempt, which soon led to discrimination.
The Catholics, on the other hand, viewed the Protestants as
invaders of their homeland, loyal first to the British
government with whom they identified.

In the eyes of

Catholics, the Protestants were Britons, not Irishmen.

As

the conflicts between the two cultures mounted, the struggle
for control of Ireland began.

12

Irish Republican Brotherhood
In the wake of the Famine of 1845-1847 a radicalized
generation of young men, most of them Catholics and of
modest social origins, formed a widespread conspiracy to
eliminate British rule in Ireland.

The Irish Republican

Brotherhood, or Fenians as they were also known, were led by
James Stephens.

He guided this fledgling group in their

search for separatism and independence.
Ireland however, was not alone in its struggle and
received sympathy from Irish-Americans.
the IRB's link to the United States.

He organized Fenian

groups from New York to San Francisco.
Green Flag:

John O'Mahoney was

Robert Kee, in The

The Bold Fenian Men, suggests that the arrival

of five hundred men from America, with arms and officers,
plus at least fifty thousand rifles, was accepted as the
prerequisite of any rising of the Irish people.6
Though support for the IRB was slowly growing in
Ireland, one of the measurements of popularity was the
degree of acceptance by the Catholic Church.

The church had

no sympathy for the rising, thus practicing Catholics were
leery of the IRB and were slow to commit to the
organization.
However, as O'Mahoney increasingly succeeded in
persuading former American soldiers, remnants of the Civil
War, to take up arms for Ireland, support from those at home
grew.

Fenian military drilling and marching became much
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more prevalent.

Stephens had made the decision to strike

against the British before the year was out.
Although the IRB was still a "secret society", they had
minimal security and were relatively open.

The British

government had little problem infiltrating the lower ranks
and placing informants within the organization.

They soon

learned of the pending uprising, and on September 12, the
British government struck.

The Fenian newspaper, Irish

People, was suppressed and the office seized.

Telegraphic

communications with Southern Ireland were cut off and a
number of IRB officials were arrested
police for two months, James Stephens, the leader of the
IRB, was arrested.
In early 1867 another uprising was in motion.

Kee

states that
the military plan was for guerrilla warfare. In many
respects it did not differ in general intention from
the scheme of action finally adopted more than fifty
years later by the Irish Republican Army of that day.7
Groups of men were to gather in different parts of Ireland,
concentrating in Dublin and the south-west.

These fighting

men were to destroy rail and telegraph communications,
attack police stations and harass government offices and
military personnel.

On March 5, the day of the scheduled

uprising, unknown to the lower ranks, the leader of the
uprising, Gordon Massey, was arrested, betrayed by an
informer.

However the IRB in Drogheda, Cork, Dublin, Clare,

Tipperary, and Limerick was on the move.

They successfully

14

carried out few of their missions and fell victim to police.
Many men were arrested that night, others the next day.

The

only success came from the guerrilla tactics of tearing up
rails, and cutting telegraph wires.

Of those men arrested

in the March uprising and sentenced to death, all except
three had their sentences commuted to time with hard labor.
Tom Garvin, in Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland
1858-1988. believes that although the Fenian uprising in
1867 was strikingly weak it "did not fail to have an effect.
It was the first streak of dawn."8

The defeat of 1867 did

not destroy Fenianism, instead it gradually nudged it on to
a quasi-legal, if still conspiratorial path.

The IRB

eventually permeated all of Ireland and became an integral
part of all nationalist movements.

The executions of the

three rebels in Manchester turned the men into martyrs and
perpetuated the cause of Irish separatism and nationalism.
The Land League
Although the Fenian movement declined in popularity
again after the rising of 1867, a new movement was quickly
underway.

Kee contends that "the aim [was] Home Rule, or

the establishment of an Irish Parliament to deal with
internal Irish affairs within the British connection and
under the Crown."9

The man chosen to represent Ireland was

29 year old Charles Stewart Parnell.

His opposition in the

House of Commons, the newly elected Prime Minister, was
William Ewart Gladstone, who came to power in 1868.

Kee
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claims that "until his final retirement in 1893 at the age
of 86 he was to concern himself with the affairs of Ireland
to a greater extent than any other English statesman since
the making of the Union."10

Gladstone believed he could

address the problems of Ireland through two measures:
/"first by disestablishing the Irish Protestant Church and,\
second, legislating to compensate a tenant financially on ,
;

eviction."11
The act which disestablished the Protestant Church in
Ireland became law in 1896.

Disestablishment of the church

was the first measure the Union Parliament had passed solely
because the majority of the Irish people wanted it.
The land issue however, was the critical issue of the
day.

Although introduced in the House of Commons with the

Irish interest at heart, Gladstone's Land Bill of 1870 was
wholly inadeguate.

He proposed imposition of a sort of fine

on any landlord who evicted a tenant for any reason other
than nonpayment of rent.

The landlord would be required to

pay the tenant for the improvements his occupation had made
to the property.
Irish farmer.

This however, was not the goal of the

The Irish tenant did not want compensation

for eviction, but freedom from eviction.

George

Dangerfield, in The Damnable Question, asserts that "the
land act of 1870, while insisting that the Irish Peasant had
rights, did absolutely nothing to advance them."12

Although

cooperation with the new Land Bill was widespread, it was
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believed that only an Irish Parliament itself could give
Ireland the justice it deserved.
In 1877, the total membership of the IRB was about
nineteen thousand.13

Unrest and increasing bitterness over

the ineffective land bill were the sentiments among the
agrarian society.

This unrest quickly turned to hatred,

when in the years 1877-1897 rainfall was far above average
and temperatures well below.

The combination of three bad

harvests made it impossible for the Irish farmer to sell his
crops at a profit.

Unable to pay rent because of the slump

in prices, the farmers were threatened with eviction.
Violence erupted again in 1879 with the shooting of not
only landlords, but Irishmen who moved onto property vacated
by eviction.

On October 21, 1879, the National Land League

of Ireland was founded.
Parnell.

It^s President was Charles Stewart

The goal of the Land League was to promote

the organization of the tenant farmers, to bring about
a reduction in rents, protect those threatened with
eviction, and finally obtain such reform in the laws
relating to the land as will enable every tenant to
become the owner of his holding by paying a fair rent
for a limited number of years. 4
The Land League, largely supported through the
membership of ex-Fenians, scheduled mass-demonstrations to
fight for lower rent, physically prevented many evictions,
and provided food and shelter for those victims of eviction.
The Land League operated through above-ground official
action and under-ground violence.

The official leadership

of the movement deplored violent measures, but they often
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were unaware of the extent of its use.

Kee claims that the

officially correct character of the organization, however,
"with its determination to right the poor man's wrongs, made
it possible for the Land League to enlist the support of the
parish priests, without which no movement in Ireland could
flourish."15
In August 1881 the Land Act was passed in the House of
Commons.

The Land Act, by giving the southern and western

renter access to the Ulster custom of fair rent, free trade
and fixity of tenure, put him into a state of "dual
ownership" with his landlord, however, it ignored the fact
that what he wanted was no landlord at all.
Home Rule
On October 20, 1881, Parnell and several of his
officials in the Land League were arrested and placed in
Kilmainham Gaol (jail).

No attempt was made to reestablish

the Land League; instead Parnell founded the Irish National
League (INL).

Stimulated by the general anti-government

feeling aroused during the recent land agitation, the INL
expressed a popular national demand for Home Rule.
For the next several years the Home Rule Bill
increasingly consumed the time of the members of the House
of Commons.

On September 2, 1893, the bill passed by the

slim margin of thirty-four.

The members of the House of

Lords, on the other hand, rejected the bill by 419 votes to
forty-one.16
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During this time, the IRB began to crumble.
split internally and was losing American support.

It had
Much of

the attention of the country was focused on the Boer War in
South Africa and with the land agitation calmed down, the
IRB found itself losing power.
In 1900, a journalist named Arthur Griffith brought men
of different Irish organizations together to unify them as
one national society.

This small organization was called

Cumann na Gaedheal; it was the nucleus of today's Sinn Fein.
The movement amounted to little at this point, and its main
purpose was to spread dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of
Home Rule.

Throughout the next ten years, members of

Parliament from Ireland fought to no avail for Home Rule in
the House of Commons.

However, in 1910, the Liberals,

backed by Irish Nationals in the House of Commons, came to
power and with support from southern Ireland the
representatives seemed able to win Home Rule.

There was

intense opposition by the Ulster Unionist Council however.
Kee maintains that the proposed bill
set up an Irish legislature with an Irish executive for
purely domestic Irish affairs, while reserving for the
Imperial Parliament all matters affecting the Crown,
peace and war, the army, navy, international treaties,
the imposition of most taxation in the first instance,
and even for a period of six years, control of the
Royal Irish Constabulary. The total supremacy of the
Imperial Parliament over such an Irish Parliament was
clearly stated and repeatedly emphasized.17
It was quickly pointed out by the Protestants of Ulster
that the probability of a Catholic majority in the Irish
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Parliament legislating for the good of the minority peoples
in Ireland was highly doubtful.

Thus, special safeguards

were implemented to give the Protestants disproportionate
consideration.

These were not enough.

The Protestants had

a conditioned self-perpetuating mistrust of all Catholics,
and they simply did not want to be placed in a subordinate
position.

The solution was an amendment to the Home Rule

Bill to exclude six of the nine counties of Ulster.
This exclusion was introduced as a temporary measure.
After six years Ulster was supposed to come under the
control of the Irish Parliament.

However, the Irish

Nationalists would hear nothing of it.

They wanted a united

Ireland, governed by an Irish Parliament.

The battle lines

were forever drawn.
In January 1913, the Ulster Volunteer Force of one
hundred thousand men, led by retired British General Sir
George Richardson, was raised.

These men carried rifles

supplied by supporters in England.

By 1914, reserve

officers from the British Army were recruited to take
command of some of the regiments of the Ulster Volunteer
Force.

Violence was seemingly inevitable, as the Irish

National Volunteers also had a membership of one hundred
thousand.

Arms for the Irish National Volunteers were

supplied from Germany and America.
Meanwhile, Parliamentary debate over Home Rule and the
exclusion of the six northern counties had become dead
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locked.

The Irish Nationals insisted that Ulster be under

Irish Parliamentary rule, however the Ulster Unionists
Council, and its English supporters adamantly rejected the
idea.

On September 18, 1914, the Home Rule Bill was given

royal assent as an Act.

It was suspended however due to the

commencement of World War I.

Home Rule was conveniently

"shelved" until after the war when a new Amending Bill could
be introduced and further debate held.
Most of southern Ireland rejoiced with the news of the
triumphant Home Rule Bill.

There was however, a group of

Sinn Fein supporters and IRB members who believed the Bill
to be inadequate because of the Suspensory Act.

These men

were the "Sinn Fein Volunteers," or as they were officially
known, the "Irish Volunteers."

They believed it unwise to

commit Irishmen to the war effort without being sure that
Home Rule would be implemented.

As the British war effort

deteriorated, the threat of conscription loomed large in
Ireland.

This threat combined with dwindling Parliamentary

support for Home Rule provided the impetus for Sinn Fein
Volunteer support from a few Catholic parish priests.
After a failed attempt to purchase arms from Germany, a
group of approximately one thousand Irish Volunteers and
members of the Irish Citizens Army marched into Dublin in a
combined effort later called "the Irish Republican Army."18
The Easter Rising of April 24, 1916, had begun.
Times reported that

The London
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at noon on that day grave disturbances broke out in
Dublin and at nightfall the rebels were in possession
of four of five parts of the city. The General Post
Office, in the heart of the Irish capital was seized
and telegraphic communications cut.15
Crown reinforcements were called in to help the police
on Monday afternoon.

These men easily out-numbered the

rebels by one thousand.

There was increased sporadic

violence; snipers, artillery fire, and bombings, directed at
the royal troops and policemen as they closed in on the
rebels.

Kee declares that

basically the pattern of the rebellion which unfolded
over the next five days was that the Irish Republican
Army remained in most of the positions it had occupied
on Easter Monday, inflicting what casualties it could and these were sometimes substantial - on Irishmen and
others in the British Army, who, backed by heavy
artillery fire, inexorably closed in on them and
eventually forced them to surrender.20
On Saturday, April 29, the rebels surrendered.
among the rebels were low:

Casualties

64 killed during the uprising.

Civilian casualties were very high in comparison:
killed, over 600 wounded.

220

Among the crown forces, 134 died,

381 were wounded.
The uprising was not popularly supported, nor was it
effective, but it was the first uprising that had ever been
conducted by Irishmen in the single-minded pursuit of an
independent Irish Republic.
On May 3, the first of fifteen executions took place at
Kilmainham Gaol in Dublin.

Throughout the following weeks,

as more rebels were shot in the name of just punishment,
resentment toward the British grew.
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David Asquith, the Prime Minister of Britain, felt the
rising tension and began working again on the Home Rule
Bill.

Edward Carson represented the Northern Unionists, and

John Redmond represented the Southern Nationalists at the
bargaining table.

At stake again were the Ulster counties.

Redmond and Carson negotiated a settlement that would
separate Ulster from Southern Ireland, immediately giving
Home Rule to the South.

In exchange, Northern Ireland was

to consist of the six Ulster counties which would not be
subject to rule by the Southern Parliament.

Without giving

either delegate time to consult with his supporters, the
Cabinet decided that the proposed settlement was to be
permanent.

Predictably, negotiations fell through and

quickly came to a grinding halt.

The Irish Nationalists

felt betrayed by Redmond for giving in on the Ulster
question.

They believed that Home Rule should be enacted as

the bill which was passed by Parliament and signed by the
King in 1914.
In 1916, Asquith was ousted from power by David LloydGeorge.

Lloyd-George had once told Carson there would be

permanent Ulster exclusion from Irish Home Rule.
Irish Republican Army
Military maneuvers and drilling began in the south
again, and by September 1917, there were over thirty
Volunteers in Mountjoy Gaol serving sentences from six
months to two years for military drilling or making so-
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called insurgent speeches.

As the movement grew it divided

once again, however Sinn Fein remained a moderate faction.
The Volunteers, on the other hand, became an independent
group raiding for guns and rustling cattle to prevent hunger
within the ranks, all in the name of the Irish Republic.
Sinn Fein's growing support was revealed at the polls
in an election in December, 1918.
the 105 Parliament seats.21

Sinn Fein won 73 out of

The President of Sinn Fein,

Eamon de Valera, took over the fight for Irish selfdetermination with the support of not only the citizens of
southern Ireland, but the Catholic church as well.

As Sinn

Fein contemplated its next move, the Volunteers began their
reign of violence.
It began in January 1919, when two constables were
killed while transporting a load of dynamite to a quarry.
Robert Kee, in the third book of his trilogy, maintains that
"the Volunteers stripped the bodies of their rifles and
ammunition and made off with these and the [dynamite]."22
While most Sinn Fein members did not condone the activities
of the Volunteers, Michael Collins was a prominent leader in
both organizations.

He sanctioned the printing of a journal

which directed the Volunteers to inflict death on the
enemies of the State.

These enemies were soldiers or

policemen of the British Government whom every volunteer was
entitled "morally and legally...to slay...if it is necessary
to do so in order to overcome their resistance."23

This
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policy of terrorism was neither the will of the people, nor
the clergy.
As the violence escalated, the government took
defensive action.

Military restrictions were imposed in

many southern cities and counties.

In turn, some of the

moderate wing of Sinn Fein reacted to this oppression by
joining the Volunteers, or Irish Republican Army as they
were now being called.

The clergy, on the other hand,

condemned the Volunteers for their violent means of action.
Members of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), many of
whom were Catholic, were being murdered by the IRA.
Civilians, soldiers, and government officials were also
being shot in cold blood, then labeled a spy by tying a tag
marked "Spy - killed by the IRA" to the corpse.24

Girls who

spoke with RIC men or soldiers would get the hair shaven
from their heads or their calves shot off.
On June 24, 1919, Collins' systematic terror against
Irish police detectives began.

Through the next two years

IRA sharpshooters, on Collins' command, executed highranking police officials who Collins perceived as
threatening.

By November, the government outlawed Sinn

Fein; however, they again swept the polls in the 192 0
election.
By January 1920, fourteen policemen had been murdered,
twenty others wounded.

Until then they had not fought back,

but with the shooting of a Constable in Thurles, the police
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began to take the offense establishing a new pattern in the
violent situation.
Throughout Ireland, police smashed windows and riddled
houses with bullets searching for the perpetrators of the
police shootings.

Chaos soon followed in a tit-for-tat

scenario of violence.

Reprisals came as sporadically as the

initial murders, primarily in the form of fire.

The

policemen burned the homes of suspected Sinn Fein members
and often burned the local creameries and destroyed
businesses and stores.

The ranks of the RIC began to thin

as policemen resigned their posts.

They were quickly

replaced however with English, as well as Irish, recruits.
By July 1921, the total RIC dead was over 400, with 700
wounded.

The total number of civilian casualties is

unknown, although in the first six months of 1921, an
estimated 7 07 civilians were killed, 7 56 wounded.

One

hundred of these civilians were shot as spies by the IRA.25
The reprisals taken by the RIC only strengthened the
will of the nationalists.

The burned homes, charred

creameries, and corpses of innocent victims were constant
reminders of the oppressive British government.
Sectarian violence was prevalent in Ulster.

This

violence was generally anti-Catholic in nature, although the
IRA did shoot a number of Protestant "spies."

The IRA

declared however, that "no one was to be attacked just
because he was a Protestant."26
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Martial law was declared in January 1921, in several
counties, and internment was now being practiced throughout
Ireland.

The government was prepared to execute all persons

captured while fighting.
executed in Cork.

In February, seven IRA men were

The next day the IRA gunned down six

soldiers in the streets of Cork.

Something similar to a

formal state of war had now indeed come about and was
accepted as such by both sides and by the Irish people.
As negotiations between de Valera and Lloyd-George
began in 1921, elections were held for the first time in the
two Parliaments created by the Government of Ireland Act of
1920.

Sinn Fein won 124 of the 128 districts in the lower

twenty-six counties and 12 out of 52 seats in the North.
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The partition of Ireland was becoming a reality.
A truce was called on July 8, 1921, and was to be
effective beginning at noon on July 11, terminable at
seventy-two hours' notice.
progress.

Negotiations were finally in

De Valera did not attend the meeting in London,

preferring instead to control the Irish Parliament in
Dublin.

Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith headed the

negotiation delegation.
On December 6, Ireland was formally separated into the
Irish Free State and Northern Ireland.

Under the terms of

the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the lower twenty-six
counties were no longer under direct British rule.

They

were now a dominion, able to rule by their own Parliament.
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Not only did they control domestic government, but foreign
affairs also.

Allegiance was not pledged to the Crown, but

instead to the newly formed Irish Free State.

Northern

Ireland was born of the six Ulster counties of Londonderry,
Antrim, Down, Armagh, Tyrone, and Monaghan.

The Northern

Ireland Parliament was retained for maintenance of domestic
matters, but Britain had direct control over all foreign
affairs, and allegiance was pledged to the Crown.
None of the five signatories from the Republic had
liked the compromises of the treaty, but Collins and
Griffith believed its advantages far outweighed its
disadvantages.

The essence of their position was that "it

gave the freedom to achieve freedom."28
Unfortunately, de Valera opposed the treaty.

It was

ratified by the Irish Parliament however, by a majority of
sixty-four to fifty-seven, and de Valera stepped down as
President.

Arthur Griffith took his place.

Again, civil

strife broke out in Ireland, this time between pro-treaty
and anti-treaty IRA factions.
Rioting in the newly formed North also broke out as
Protestants learned that three of the nine Ulster counties
had been sacrificed.

Bitter fighting between the Catholics,

backed by both factions of the IRA, and the Protestants,
supported by the Ulster Special Constabulary, resulted in
massive losses.

In three weeks in February, 138 casualties

were reported from Belfast, of whom 98 were Catholics.
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Thirty people were killed in a single night.

Thousands of

Catholic refugees poured into southern Ireland; some even
left the country.29
Elections for the Irish Parliament were held in 1922
and reflected the majority pro-treaty opinion of the South.
Ninety-four of the 128 members of the new government were in
favor of the Treaty.

Collins now had unmistakable

democratic support for the Treaty.
Nevertheless, fighting continued in the Irish Free
State between the anti-treaty and pro-treaty forces.

On

June 30, under the direction of Collins, the newly formed
government army arrested over one hundred anti-treaty
activists.

In the ensuing battle, sixty-three people were

killed, 3 00 wounded, and a section of Dublin burned or
destroyed by bullets.

The remaining anti-treaty forces

retreated to Cork, but by August, Collins' army, with the
help of the British government, dismantled them.

Only a

handful of militant IRA members were left.
Unfortunately, the calm in the Irish Free State was
shattered with the sudden death of their President, Arthur
Griffith, and the murder, ten days later, of Michael
Collins.

Ironically, Collins was killed by the same squad

which he at one time had commanded.

The new leaders took

even harsher steps against the anti-treaty remnants, now
called the "Republicans."

Within six months the new Free

State Government executed seventy-seven Republicans.30

Due
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to a lack of support, the IRA was forced to go underground.
The group fell out of sight and remained largely dormant for
many years.

Although sporadic fighting continued through

the mid-1900s, the IRA did not fully resurface again until
the 1960s.
Provisional Irish Republican Army
Severely oppressed by the Protestants in Northern
Ireland, Catholic tolerance of government sanctioned
discrimination waned.

In a society dominated by Protestants

by two to one, housing, labor, income, and social
discrimination was rampant.

Voting was permitted only by

land-owners, and very few Catholics owned land.

Therefore,

the North was governed primarily by land-owning Protestants.
As tension began to mount, Catholics emulated the civil
rights movement lea by the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in
the southern United States.

The inspiration of King led

several Catholics to develop the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association.

Catholics marched from Belfast to

Londonderry protesting the discrimination under which they
had been forced to live.

Predictably, they were taunted and

beaten by Protestants, as the police, the Royal Ulster
Constabulary (RUC), looked on.
Alex Greer, in "Nationalism, Internationalism, and the
Conflict in Northern Ireland," maintains that the original
intent of the IRA in 1969 "was not violent, but a campaign
of nonsectarian and non-violent political education and
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activism."31

However, as violence against demonstrating

civilians and the IRA continued, a split occurred within the
IRA, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged.

As

fighting and rioting continued, the PIRA turned to more
violent means of countering the mobs of angry Protestants.
As the pillaging and burning of Catholic communities
continued, the British Army was brought in to restore order.
At first the troops were greeted warmly by the Catholics.
They were seen as protectors, but soon the Army was viewed
as another useless organ of the oppressive Protestant
government, which by this time had outlawed all forms of
anti-government demonstrations.

The PIRA became the

guardian of the Catholic ghettos in Ulster, particularly in
Belfast.

David Schmitt reports in "Bicommunal Conflict and

Accommodation in Northern Ireland" that "the internment
operation of 1971 in which Catholics were indiscriminately
picked up and sometimes abused" to learn information about
the PIRA, "radicalized most of the Catholic community."32
The situation deteriorated even further on January 30, 1972-"Bloody Sunday."
As seven thousand demonstrators, some of whom were PIRA
members, marched down the streets of Londonderry, they were
brutally attacked by two hundred heavily-armed paratroopers
from the British Army.

Allegedly, some of the marchers

threw rocks and bricks at the soldiers, who in turn launched
tear gas and purple dye at the demonstrators, and finally
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opened fire.

The short, but violent battle ended with

thirteen civilians killed, seventeen wounded, and seventy
arrested.33

Anger and hate toward the Army grew as the

ranks of the PIRA swelled with volunteers.

Padraig O'Malley

contends that "by the mid-1970s the PIRA had fifteen hundred
members, six hundred of whom were believed to be in
Belfast."34

Killing and maiming by PIRA bombs or snipers

was an almost daily routine in Northern Ireland as one bomb
after another killed civilians as well as soldiers.
Retaliation to the violence was daily also.
On March 24, 1972, the Northern Ireland Parliament was
abruptly closed and Britain took direct control of the
government giving full power to Westminster.

The government

was dissolved due to the escalating violence and the
judicial system which processed those arrested for
terrorism.

In Northern Ireland witnesses were considered

informers.

The incentive for keeping one's mouth shut, eyes

closed, and mind blank was a long life.

PIRA jury

intimidation was wide-spread in the North, leading Britain
to establish the Diplock Courts in the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973.
The Diplock Courts replaced the standard jury trial
with that of one judge.

The Act also provided for the

warrantless detention of suspected terrorists for up to
seventy-two hours and wide powers of search and seizure by
members of the security forces.

Many members of the
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Catholic community were harassed by police and soldiers, and
some were arrested.

More than thirty thousand homes were

searched in 1972, sixty thousand in 1973.
In 1972 support was strong for the PIRA.

O'Malley

maintains however, that by 1975 "the movement had largely
disintegrated, gangsterism was pervasive," and feuding
between the Official IRA and the PIRA was increasing.35
1976 the PIRA was well encamped in Northern Ireland.

In

They

recognized their inefficiency and reorganized their
structure from an hierarchical one, based on neighborhood
groups, to a cellular organization.

This new structure made

it very difficult for authorities to infiltrate the
organization, and informers were virtually eliminated.
In March, 1976, the British government rescinded the
"special category" status of prisoners convicted of
political crimes, mainly members of the PIRA.

Prisoners

responded by refusing to wear prison garb or do prison work.
When this strategy failed, the hunger strikes began.

The

first strikes were abandoned after only a few weeks of
starvation.

However, five years later, Bobby Sands, the

commanding officer of the PIRA within the prison, began his
hunger strike.

He was starving himself for more than mere

political prisoner status, he was starving himself as an
expression of the fight "between the oppressed Irish people
and an alien, oppressive, unwanted regime that refuses to
withdraw from our land."36

He died sixty-six days later. In

33

the next three months, nine other prisoners also died of
starvation.

Despite the casualties, the hunger strike was

an effective method of creating martyrs and recruiting
support.
On October 13, 1984, the PIRA attempted to assassinate
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a long-time enemy of the
IRA.

Thatcher escaped without injury, but three people died

and thirty-four were hurt as a result of the explosion.
This was the first attempt on a Prime Minister's life in
sixty years.
Negotiations to end the crisis in Northern Ireland led
to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

This agreement

provided the Republic of Ireland with a direct hand in the
governmental affairs concerning minority Catholics in
Northern Ireland.

Expectedly, the Unionist community was

strongly opposed to the Agreement.

Protestant para

militaries threatened to kill members of the Secretariat and
other participants.

Although a courageous attempt by

British and Irish officials, Schmitt argues that the result
was little more than an "imaginative attempt to create a
framework for progress in reducing political violence and
generating a sense of legitimacy."37
As the PIRA violence continued, support began again to
dwindle in the South.

Presently support comes from a small

number of Catholics in Northern Ireland.

Even so, the PIRA

is now one of the world's best equipped and most experienced
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guerrilla armies.

According to British security officials,

"there are probably no more than forty active gunmen in the
North, supported by about 150 Volunteers.38
political support for the PIRA is shrinking.

However,
Part of the

reason may be the partial ban on Sinn Fein publicity,
although the party itself is legal.

Another reason is the

Catholic church's view that denounces the IRA and says that
voting for Sinn Fein is a mortal sin.

In the 1984 local

election in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein won only 11.2% of
the vote.

In the 1984 election for the European Parliament,

Sinn Fein received only 2.8% of the vote for the entire
island.39

Roman Catholic opposition to the IRA in Northern

Ireland is embodied in the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (SDLP) founded in 1970.

The New York Times reports

that the SDLP "represents more than 90% of the nationalist
population on both sides of the Irish border."40
Richard Clutterbuck claims that since 1969, "nearly
2,000 people, only a third of them in the uniforms of the
British Army or the Royal Ulster Constabulary have died in
the struggle over the northern six counties of Ireland," and
over 10,000 people have been injured.41

As the PIRA

continues to participate in terrorist activities, their
popular support shrinks.
Clutterbuck maintains that families living in Catholic
ghettos in Northern Ireland are "becoming exasperated with
the continual involvement of their children in the fighting,
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and it is probable that less than one third now support the
IRA."42

The overwhelming majority of Catholics support the

non-violence of the SDLP.

The violence of the PIRA has

served only to "alienate their own Catholic supporters in
the North."43
Alienation had also been the effect of prolonged
terrorism not only in the Republic, but also in the USA,
where contributions to the "welfare" funds which provide a
transparent cover for financing and arming the IRA have
fallen to a trickle.

Additionally, the IRA has aroused

Protestant dislike and distrust of all Catholics to the
point where reunification without another civil war is
impossible.

Clutterbuck states further that "neither the

government in Dublin, nor the people of the South have any
desire at present to shatter the peace of the Republic by
bringing in vicious warring factions from the North, whether
Protestant or Catholic."44

He further states that "the only

reunification which the IRA have achieved has been to bring
about unprecedented unity between London and Dublin."45
Conclusion
The IRB was an organization which garnered support only
during crisis and only with the help of martyrs.

The rising

of 1867 had little popular support, and was a failure.

The

mobilizing factor for Home Rule was not the movement itself,
but the martyrdom of the three men executed by the British
for participating in the 1867 uprising.

After the Land Act

36

was passed in 1881, membership again declined because the
goals of the members, ownership of the land, had been met
with the implementation of "dual ownership."
In the early 1900s the organization not only lost Irish
support, but it split into several factions.

The passing of

the Home Rule Bill in 1914 had little to do with the Irish
National Volunteers, but was negotiated by political means,
not violence and terrorism.

The uprising of 1916, the fight

for Home Rule, was neither popularly supported, nor was it
effective.
The violence in the early 1920s seems the catalyst for
the separation of Ireland into two countries.

The IRA was

not only fighting the British and the Protestants, but also
themselves when the organization split into pro- and antitreaty factions.

The IRA was not the only violent

organization however; in retaliation soldiers and police
used terrorist tactics also.

The only difference was that

the IRA was illegal and the counter-movement was not.
Regardless of the instigators, the violence of the 1920s
caused the emergence of Northern Ireland under the Crown.
Again, little was accomplished through the employment of
violence.
The only constructive movement thus far seems to be the
early civil rights movement of the late 1960s.

The movement

was initially organized by people who were not affiliated
with the IRA and was to be a non-violent expression of
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Protestant oppression of Catholics.

There is little doubt

that the Prbtestants started abusing the Catholics during
the protest marches, and that the Catholics were on the
defensive.

However, when the PIRA was born and firmly

encamped themselves in the Catholic ghettos, whole Catholic
communities were reduced to targets for the RUC and the
British Army.
It is clear that support for the PIRA declined in the
late 197 0s and early 1980s until the hunger strikes
resurrected the movement through martyrdom.

But even this

burst of popular support was short lived as the horrors of
terrorism hit home in Ireland.

Since the last deluge of

support in the mid-1980s, the PIRA had been steadily losing
its popular and financial support.
There is little doubt that the PIRA is a well organized
group that will continue to terrorize Britain, Northern
Ireland, and parts of Europe.

It seems however, that these

activities only strengthen the resolve of the British to
rule Northern Ireland and perpetuate the separation of
Ireland.

The PIRA will therefore fail to rid Northern

Ireland of English influence through violent means, and
consequently, fail to attain its goals.
The IRA and the PIRA of late have done nothing but hurt
the Irish people, mainly innocent civilians who are caught
in the cross-fire.

It is unlikely that the goal of

reunification of Ireland will be met through violence.
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Violence only begets violence; the many bloody reprisals of
the British and Protestants are proof.
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CHAPTER 3
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY
All civil violence had a purpose, an end, a goal.
James Rule, a noted scholar in the field of civil violence
and terrorism, maintains that "the objective and targets of
militant collective action [will] reflect pursuit of long
term collective interest of the groups represented in the
action.111
This chapter examines the objectives and targets of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

This

examination includes an analysis of the tactical and
strategic objectives and collective interests, as well as an
examination of the infrastructure of the PIRA and the groups
represented by the PIRA.

This chapter concludes with a

discussion on the accuracy of the representation accorded
Catholics by the Provisionals (members of the PIRA).
Tactical Strategies
The universal aim of terror is intimidation, the
creation of fear and anxiety.
random use of violence.
goal.

Terrorism is usually not the

This violence has a purpose and a

Terrorism is merely a tactical strategy used to

create a feeling of panic among those who are targeted.
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It

is also used to attract the media, creating a further
feeling of helplessness.

Walter Laqueur, a noted scholar in

the area of terrorism and terrorist groups, argues that a
terrorist organization cannot survive without media
coverage, in fact, "the smaller the terrorist gang the more
it depends on publicity."2

The tactical strength of the

PIRA is a long war of attrition.

The Provos believe that

they can reach their ultimate goal of reunification with the
Republic by waging a bombing and assassination campaign
against prominent citizens in Northern Ireland and Britain.
Bombings
There are several ways of achieving tactical success.
Terrorist use of bombs is a universal strategy.

Since the

creation of plastic explosives, bombs are virtually
undetectable.

They are convenient, many are compact, and

can be detonated with the use of remote control.

Bombs can

be effective even if no none is injured or killed.

They

wreak extensive structural damage and make a great deal of
noise, drawing attention which inevitably results in media
publicity.

Michael Poole, a lecturer at the New University

of Ulster, states that bombings are the incidents that
arouse the greatest political and public concern, "they have
the greatest impact on the community and, not least, they
are the best documented.1,3
Bombings in Northern Ireland were very frequent during
the early 1970s, and parts of Belfast have been reduced to
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empty, charred structures.

Padraig O'Malley explains:

Belfast, ugly and sore to the eye, the will to go on
gone, the signs of departure everywhere. In ten years
it has lost one quarter of its population. Buildings
are boarded up. There is little construction, and no
skyline. Business is desultory, pace is lacking,
energy absent, burned out housing estates a vivid
reminder of the sectarian tensions that mark the quiet
expression of the passion in private places.4
Table 2.—Persons Killed in Explosions from 1972-1978 in
Northern Ireland
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

Number Killed in Explosions
143
69
57
76
71
13
25

Source: Adrian Guelke,"Loyalist and Republican Perceptions
of the Northern Ireland Conflict: The Ulster defense Force
and the Provisional IRA," chap, in Political Violence and
Terrorism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986),
103, table 3.
The sophistication of PIRA explosives has grown with
increasing commercial technology.

In the early days the IRA

used unsophisticated devices made from alarm clocks,
electric circuits and inflammable material.

These days the

bombs are often hidden inside cassette tape boxes or
gasoline cans and are virtually undetectable.
Incendiary devices, or firebombs, have long been a
favorite weapon in the armory of the IRA.

They were

developed in the mid-1970s as a device for reaching targets
with high consumer or passenger traffic.

Incendiary bombs
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have been found at several London train stations, inside
underground trains, and in several Manchester stores.

Left

intact, the devices would have exploded into a sudden blaze,
then created a larger fire, eventually destroying the
property and possibly injuring or killing many.
Few are immune from the Provisionals.

Then Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher was the target of a bomb placed
in The Grand Hotel on October 13, 1984.

This particular

explosion created world-wide attention, as it was the first
attempt on the life of a Prime Minister in sixty years.
One of the most effective bombings by the Provos occurred in
London on July 20, 1980.

Six British soldiers on horseback

and two civilians were killed, and fifty others were injured
when two bombs exploded during ceremonial duties.

One

company of soldiers in full regalia was making the daily
ride from their barracks to Whitehall, the other members
were in the band and playing to a lunchtime audience.
O'Malley states that "the spectacle of the splendid animals
reduced to a bloodied pulp moved the public as much, if not
more, than the human dead."5
The London Times reports however that bombs are "used
infrequently on the British mainland [and] remain a mainstay
of the IRA campaign in Ulster."6

Between January and August

of 1991, the RUC had recorded 39 incidents involving 169
incendiary devices, and fourteen stores were destroyed in
Belfast causing 25 million pounds in damage.7
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A particularly gruesome method of bombing used by the
Provos in Northern Ireland is a "proxy bomb."

The PIRA will

kidnap a family and force one person to drive a vehicle
containing the bomb to its destination while holding the
other family members hostage to ensure completion of the
mission.

If the orders or not carried out, and the bomb is

not delivered, the Provos will murder the hostages and
detonate the bomb by remote control killing the driver.
This method was used on February 4, 1991 to blow up an
Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) base in County Londonderry,
causing considerable damage to the base and surrounding
homes.
On April 9, 1991, the Provisionals used a woman hostage
as a "human bomb" in an attempt to blow up a border police
station in County Fermenaugh*

The Tiroes reports that the

woman, who worked at the station, was forced to carry the
bomb in her handbag while her husband and child were held
hostage.

The bomb exploded minutes after it was delivered,

but no one was injured.

In October of 1990, six soldiers

and a civilian died in similar "human bomb" attacks on
military check points in Londonderry and Newry.8
Assassinations
Assassination is another effective strategy employed by
terrorists.

Assassination is not merely the murder of a

high ranking official, but the slaying of any targeted
person.

Between 1972 and 1978 approximately 625 people were

assassinated in Northern Ireland, however not all of them
were victims of the PIRA.

Some were victims of the Ulster

Defense Force (UDF) and other Protestant paramilitary
groups.9
Assassinations are useful not only to eliminate the
target, but also to warn others that holding similar
positions, views, and attitudes could result in the same
fate.
Table 3.—Sectarian, Intrafractional, and Interfractional
Assassinations from 1972-1978 in Northern Ireland
Number Assassinated
122
87
95
144
121
42
14

Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

Source: Adrian Guelke, "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions
of the Northern Ireland Conflict: The Ulster Defense Force
and the Provisional IRA," chap, in Political Violence and
Terror (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986),
103, table 3.
Assassination is an invaluable tactic against the
elites, for the execution of prominent officials causes
abundant fear and anxiety among those who either govern or
support the government.

The assassination of Lord

Mountbatten by the Provos on August 27, 1979, garnered much
media attention as international outcries of sorrow and rage
poured forth.
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Policemen in Northern Ireland are often PIRA
assassination targets.

Two were shot in the head in a

crowded city center market in Belfast on July 1, 1990.

The

Times states that the PIRA claimed responsibility for the
incident and the Superintendent of the RUC issued this
statement of contempt:

"Once again this demonstrated the

utterly indiscriminate way these people go about their
business."10
Member of Parliament Ian Gow was the fourth sitting MP
to be assassinated by the Provos when a car bomb exploded at
his house on July 30, 1990.

The Times reports that the name

of the outspoken anti-IRA MP was found on a "hit list" in
1989, and he was warned to take extra security measures to
ensure his safety.

The Provos said they assassinated Mr.

Gow because he was "a close and personal associate of
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher," and because he
wielded considerable political influence in the political
affairs of Northern Ireland.11
Contrary to the statement issued by the Superintendent
of the RUC, the assassination of the two officers was not
indiscriminate.

They were shot because they were involved

with the security forces in Northern Ireland and because the
PIRA knew the murders would garner media attention.

Lord

Mountbatten, Ian Gow and the many others who have been PIRA
victims were assassinated for similar reasons.

Simply put,

it furthered the Provisionals' goal of tactical success.
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Hunger Strikes
Although not detrimental to the lives of those
uninvolved in a hunger strike, this tactic is used to garner
support for those involved, mainly PIRA members, and capture
worldwide media attention.
debatable.

The success of this tactic is

It is true that initially a hunger strike will

attract sympathizers and media attention, but that attention
and sympathy usually fade as the hunger strikers perish.
Sometimes however, a hunger strike can lead to negotiations
and tactical success.
As a result of a hunger strike in June 1972, the
"special category" status was accorded those prisoners who
were convicted of "political" crimes.

In essence this meant

that political prisoners, most of whom were PIRA and IRA
members, were not required to wear prison uniforms, were
allowed more visits and food parcels, and had better
facilities than ordinary prisoners.

This status was revoked

in March 1976, prompting prisoners to go "on the blanket."
They wore no clothes, and did no work, including cleaning
themselves or their cells.

This strategy was a failure, and

the hunger strike resumed in October 1980.

On March 1,

1981, Bobby Sands, the commanding IRA officer within Maze
prison began his hunger strike.

He attempted, not only to

regain special status, but to gather much needed popular
support for the Provisionals.

He died sixty-six days later,

followed by nine others within three months.

50

Even though the hunger strike did not prompt the
reintroduction of the special category status, one scholar
believes that it was an unequivocal success.

In Padraig

O'Malley's words, it
allowed the IRA to reestablish itself in the heroic
mold and to reaffirm its legitimacy in the historical
context, thereby making it more difficult to dismiss
the IRA as mere terrorists with no political
constituency and representative of nothing other than
the fragmented dream of a demented few.12
Desecration
Another form of intimidation is the desecration of
certain institutions, churches and especially government
buildings.

This form of terrorism is implicit, and is often

a warning device which advertises future consequences if the
present warning is not heeded.
form of graffiti and vandalism.

This warning can come in the
Members of Provisional Sinn

Fein, the political wing of the PIRA, have painted slogans
advocating violence on the walls of many Belfast businesses.
This form of terrorism is useful because of its simplicity.
It requires no training or expertise, and the only necessary
equipment is a can of spray paint.
Members or sympathizers of both Protestant and Catholic
paramilitary organizations painted graffiti on community
walls during the hunger strikes in 1981.

In Catholic areas

elaborate murals began to appear, some depicting bearded
hunger strikers in Christ-like images.

One person painted

"Blessed are those who hunger for justice," high on a gable
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wall.

Graffiti of quite opposite meaning appeared in

several Protestant communities.

"Let Bobby Sands Die," "Let

Bobby Sands Rot in Hell," and "Don't be Vague, Starve a
Taig," (taig is slang for Catholic) were written on walls in
loyalist districts.
Harassment
Another tactic harassment of the enemy.
be either verbal or physical brutality.

Harassment can

Although physical

brutality is not a common trademark of the Provos, their
sympathizers often verbally taunt soldiers and policemen and
throw rocks, bottles, and sticks at them.

This strategy is

meant to invite retaliation, which it does, so the PIRA can
justify its existence as protector of the Catholic minority
and justify the further use of violence.
On Easter Sunday, April 12, 1981, the PIRA held
demonstrations and parades in several towns in Northern
Ireland to show support for Bobby Sands.

After the

ceremonies were over in Londonderry a group of fifty
teenagers began stoning policemen and soldiers.

As the

pelting continued, two army Land Rovers came speeding at the
demonstrators at an estimated fifty miles per hour.
vehicles smashed into the crowd killing two boys.

The
The

Catholics of Derry and several members of the PIRA
retaliated on April 14 and 15 by stealing and burning
thirty-one cars and buses and lobbing acid bombs at the
security forces.

The retaliation of the soldiers made
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martyrs of the boys and energized the crowd:

in other

words, the harassment was a success, despite the deaths of
the youngsters.
Kidnapping
Ceremonial terrorism is another effective tactic.
Kidnapping and hostage-taking fall into this category.

It

is mainly used as an attention-grabbing media event.
Tactically, hostage taking is a good strategy.

Hostages can

be used for financial gain through extortion or a bartering
tool for arms and ammunition.

The possession of hostages

may also guarantee safety for the terrorists.

The

government of the hostages will not employ large-scale
violent methods of eliminating terrorists for fear of
accidentally killing the hostages.

With the exception of

those hostages used for proxy bomb and human bomb purposes,
the Provos have used kidnapping minimally.

Between 1973 and

1978, only eight people were kidnapped, six in the United
Kingdom, and two in the Republic.
PIRA Targets
Targets of the PIRA are not chosen at random.

To

reiterate, these people are chosen to meet specific goals of
intimidation.

This violence is sometimes viewed as

primarily sectarian, but that is not the case because the
Provos target only those who will serve their purpose,
mainly government officials or members of the security
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forces.

Unfortunately, accidents happen, and the

Provisionals have admitted sorrow when a child is caught by
an explosion or in the cross-fire.

Certain buildings such

as bus terminals, train stations, and army buildings are
also targeted by the Provos.
Civilian casualties are very common in Northern
Ireland.

According to a study done by Michael McKeown,

there were 1,163 civilians killed due to the strife in
Ulster from 1968 to 1980.11

One household in fifteen had

been touched by the disturbances.

The Provos alone are not

to blame for this high rate of death though.

The Royal

Ulster Constabulary, the Ulster Defense Force (UDF), and the
British military all have contributed to the high casualty
rate.

The Protestant paramilitaries have largely been a

reactive force*

Barry White, in

11

From Conflict to

Violence," states that
the Unionists have a siege mentality and they regard
any challenge to the status quo as subversive, and a
cause for retaliation. This has led them to indulge in
openly sectarian attacks [and] to terrorize the
Catholic population.14
An instance of Catholics becoming PIRA targets occurred
around 1972 as they were "persuaded" to leave the UDF.

At

the insistence of the Provos, the number of Catholics
involved in the UDF dropped from eighteen percent in 1972 to
an insignificant two percent in 1980.

Catholics who are

suspected informants are readily assassinated, as are those
disloyal to the cause.

54

Areas where many people gather are easily targeted.
Although "not authorized," the PIRA claimed responsibility
for a car bomb which exploded outside Herrod's department
store in London on December 18, 1983.

Six people including

two policemen were killed, and seventy-seven people were
injured.

On February 14, 1991, the Provos claimed

responsibility for bombing the Victoria and Paddington train
stations, killing one man and injuring forty other persons.
The first bomb exploded at Paddington station at 4:20 am,
causing extensive damage to the roof, but hurting no one.
The second bomb detonated at 7:40 am, just as the morning
rush hour was beginning.

A platform full of commuters was

violently rocked, sending those people into an instant
panic.

As The Times of London states, "had the device,

containing 7 lbs of explosives, gone off twenty minutes
later, there would probably have been three times as many
casualties.
Prominent members in the British government are also
targeted for execution by the Provisionals.

Prime Minister

John Major and his War Cabinet, meeting at 10 Downing
Street, London, were the targets of a mortar attack on
February 7, 1991.

Four people were slightly injured, and

numbers 10, 11, and 12 Downing Street all somewhat damaged
as windows shattered and outer walls were scorched.

This

particular attack was a decisive victory for the PIRA as
they have never come so close to 10 Downing Street, and they
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had never before used mortars in Britain.

The attack was

easily carried out because the mortars were launched from an
abandoned van parked in front of the Prime Minister's
residence.

Professor Paul Wilkinson, an expert on

terrorism, was quoted as saying:
the bombing highlighted the IRA's ability to deliver
blows that were psychologically and physically
damaging. Attacking 10 Downing Street had obviously
great propaganda value; but the physical threat had
been shown to be very real.16
Although most assassinations of military personnel take
place in Northern Ireland or England, the Provos have by no
means limited themselves to those areas.

In 1989 a Royal

Air Force Corporal stationed in Germany was assassinated by
the Provos.

He was not alone when gunmen targeted him, and

his six-month-old daughter was also killed.

The IRA said it

expressed "profound regret for killing the child."17
The group which has taken the brunt of PIRA assassina
tions is the combined security forces in Northern Ireland.
Between 1974 and 1980, 131 British soldiers had been killed,
most by shooting or bombing attacks.

Between 1970 and 1986,

377 members of the RUC and the UDF were murdered by
terrorists, and over 6,000 were injured.

The same day that

Lord Mountbatten was assassinated, August 27, 1979, the
Provos killed eighteen members of the British Army south of
Belfast.

As three trucks filled with soldiers passed by a

vehicle carrying a stack of hay, a bomb, hidden in the hay,
was detonated by remote control from a nearby bush.
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On November 2, 1991, two soldiers were killed, six
injured, and four civilians injured during a bomb attack on
the military wing of a Belfast hospital.

It was the first

bomb attack on a hospital since the beginning of the present
troubles in 1968.

The Times reports that the PIRA claimed

responsibility and said that the intended target was not the
civilian portion of the hospital, but what it called "the
British Army base next to it," referring to the military
wing.18
Internal Machinery of the Provisional IRA
Organization
The organization of the Provisional IRA has changed
considerably over the years.
on a neighborhood basis.

Before 1977, it was organized

Padraig O'Malley says that "the

structure was hierarchical—brigades, battalions, and
companies drew their members from the neighborhoods in which
they would operate."19
This structure made the movement highly accessible,
causing much infiltration and high rates of arrest for those
suspected of terrorist activities.

By the mid 1970s the

Provos had fifteen hundred members, six hundred of whom were
in Belfast.
units.

In 1977, the group reorganized into cellular

These very active units consist of three or four

members drawn from different neighborhoods.

Each unit is

specialized in its tactical performance; rarely does an
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explosives unit use guns, and vice versa.

Information is

disseminated on a "need to know basis", and only one member
is given advance instructions.

This new organization has

made the Provos less dependent on public support and less
vulnerable to informers.

In 1988, there were no more than

forty active gunmen in the North, supported by approximately
150 volunteers.

There were only eight brigades operating

from "The North command."20
Membership
Membership is highly selective in the PIRA.

A recruit

may be scrutinized for up to a year before being allowed to
join.

Hard drinkers and loud individuals are readily

dismissed.

Brigadier James Glover, who was the General

Commanding Officer of British forces in Northern Ireland,
was quoted as saying, "The PIRA is essentially a workingclass organization based in the ghetto areas of the cities
and in the poor rural areas."21
Contrary to popular theory, the Provos are not made up
of the dregs of society.

Recruitment is fairly easy, young

men and women who grew up in the violent areas on Northern
Ireland often aspire to become full-time terrorists, and
there is a steady stream of dedicated and embittered
terrorists being released from prison.

The prisons

themselves have a command structure and classes where
terrorists can learn "everything from republicanism to
weaponry."22
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Arms and Financial Support
Armament and financial support for terrorist movements
comes from many sources.

Dr. Michael McKinley in the essay

"The Irish Republican Army and Terror International" claims
that by 1973, "at least 282 types of weapons had been
discovered [belonging to PIRA members] representing fifteen
countries of origin."23

Czechoslovakian explosives and

pistols, and Soviet-made rifles, hand-grenades and rocket
launchers are among the large cache of armament in PIRA
possession.
In the 1970s, the Libyan government of Colonel Mu•ammar
al-Qaddafi and the Palestine Liberation Organization also
sent shipments of arms to the Provos.

In October 1987, a

ship was seized carrying 150 tons of weapons from Libya to
Northern Ireland. Included in the cargo were surface-to-air
missiles, mortar shells, rocket launchers, and Semtex high
explosive.24
By 1974, the Provisionals were armed with Californiamade armelite AR130's and variants of the American military
Ml carbine and AR1S semi-automatic weapons.

The Provos even

had a few American military M60 fully-automatic machine guns
which were presumed stolen from a National Guard Armory in
Danvers, MA.

In addition, explosives were readily diverted

to Northern Ireland by sympathizers working on the New York
City water tunnel in the 1970s.

Arms also came from

sympathizers in Canada and the Irish Northern Aid Committee
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(NORAID), based in the United States, who sent rifles, hand
guns, and ammunition.25
Financial aid comes from NORAID as well.

From 1969 to

1981, at least $1,971,796 was sent to IRA officials in
Northern Ireland.

However, unofficial NORAID sources have

boasted of sending as much as $5 million to the IRA over
that same eleven years.

One anonymous NORAID representative

was quoted in 1971 as saying:
Our job is to get up the money and send it to the
people over there. What they use it for is up to them.
We attach no strings. Everything we do in this country
is aimed at assisting the final phase of the struggle
for freedom in Ireland.26
In 1975 NORAID claimed to have eighty chapters in the United
States with approximately two thousand members nationwide.
The largest concentrations are in Boston, New York City,
Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and other large cities
across the country.

By 1989, however, donations had dropped

off to an estimated $175,000 annually.
The IRA and the Provisional IRA have interior financial
capabilities as well.

In the early 1970s they ran

extensive protection rackets involving local shop owners,
publicans (pub owners) and industrialists.

James Adams, in

his essay "The Financing of Terror," believes that "every
major business in [Northern Ireland] has been sucked into
the protection racket."27

The organization legitimized the

protection by claiming that it was merely a security firm.
John DeLorean, former owner of the defunct DeLorean Motor
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Company, was one of the many who "employed" the security
firm.28
One semi-legitimate operation the IRA and the Provos
run is their taxi service.

It began in 1972 with five

"black cabs" purchased in London.

Shortly thereafter the

IRA stoned and bombed the city-run bus service in Belfast
destroying over three hundred buses.

The IRA replaced the

bus service with six hundred cabs, two garages, and eighteen
full-time employees.

In 1986, the IRA's taxi companies,

Falls Taxis and Peoples Taxis, had approximately 350 cabs,
eight full-time employees, and claimed assets in excess of
one million pounds.
Other activities to raise money for the IRA and PIRA
include fraud on building sites, the sale of legal and
illegal alcohol in Northern Ireland's night clubs and armed
robbery.

In 1973 they stole $42,000 from various Belfast

banks.29

Counterfeit money is another illegal activity in

which the IRA participates.
In September 1988, $2 million in American counterfeit
currency was seized in Dublin.

On February 7, 1989, an IRA

operative was arrested in New York City for attempting to
smuggle over $13,000 in counterfeit bills into the United
States.

Irish authorities claim the money was intended to

pay for IRA and PIRA operations.

The Times reports that in

1989 the PIRA and IRA generated ten million pounds from
"mafia-style operations ranging from protection rackets,
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extortion and armed robbery to fraud, smuggling and drug
dealing."30
From these various attempts to maintain financial and
organizational stability, one can draw a picture of a wellorganized, established group which intends to keep fighting
for its goals at all costs.
Representation by the PIRA
The Provisional IRA professes to have the long-term
well-being of the Catholic minority at heart when it uses
terrorism to attain its goals.

They believe that they are

the voice of the minority and have its full support and
cooperation.

They view themselves as protectors of the

people and defenders of the cause.
The role of the Provisionals in Catholic ghettos is
more than mere representative and protector however.

They

are a quasi-security force who act as policemen and often
punish those Catholics found guilty of crimes against their
neighbors.

These "ghetto laws" are often issued through

directives pushed through residents' mail slots or warnings
painted on walls in the district.
John Conroy, an American journalist who periodically
spent time in Northern Ireland from 1977-1985, says that
residents are allowed to rob a bank or post office, but only
to support the movement.

Stealing from a neighbor is

forbidden, but stealing from the government is allowed and
even encouraged.

Teenagers are not allowed to steal cars or
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trucks, except during riots when they are used as
barricades.

During a riot one may steal a bus, but not a

black taxi.
Policemen are legitimate targets anywhere, anytime, of
abuse, harassment, stones, bombs, and bullets.
however, are always immune.

Firemen,

For store owners, dealing in

smuggled goods is permissible, dealing in stolen goods is
forbidden.

Inebriation is acceptable behavior, as is the

taking of valium.

Serving liquor to a minor is an offense,

as is the use of heroin.

Rape is a crime with swift and

often severe consequences.31
Punishment is meted out according to the severity of
the crime.

After the first offense one is always given a

verbal warning; beyond that punishment is usually swift and
very painful.

The Provos' sentence is "kneecapping."

is the practice of shooting an offender in the knee.

This
A

light sentence is a bullet through the fleshy part of the
thigh.

A heavy sentence results in the destruction of bones

and arteries.

These sentences range from the shooting of

one leg to both legs, and even both arms and legs, also
called "the silver cross."

Conroy maintains that between

1973 and 1985 there were 1,110 kneecappings.32

If an

offender fails to forego his errant ways, he is executed.
Like the offenses, there are guidelines to punishments.
Women are never kneecapped and those offenders under sixteen
are beaten, but rarely shot.

If the parents of a youngster
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are deemed irresponsible, either the father is beaten or
both parents are banned from local pubs.

While popular in

the early 1970s, the Provos have abandoned the practice of
tarring and feathering, and no longer douse offenders with
paint or diesel oil.
Conroy maintains that the Provisionals relied primarily
on kneecapping in 1980 to keep the community in line.

It

does not always work however and some people are kneecapped
on more than one occasion.

Andy Tyrie, the leader of the

UDA, maintains that the fear instilled by the Provos "never
works if it occurs over a period of time.
to being threatened."33

People get used

The PIRA continues to kneecap

Catholic residents because he ghetto needs policing, and if
they did not do it, the people would eventually turn to the
RUC.

Conroy claims that "acceptance of the police would

ultimately result in the rejection of the IRA."34
Adrian Guelke, in "Loyalist and Republican Perceptions
of the Northern Ireland Conflict," claims that the
Provisionals are losing support because they can not protect
Catholic residents from the sectarian and random killings by
the Protestant paramilitaries.35
Support in the South is also lacking.

Northern

Catholics are often seen as their own worst enemies:
petulant, demanding, and insistent.

People in the rest of

Great Britain are generally disinclined to concentrate
heavily on the problems of Northern Ireland, again because
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they view it as a distinctively Irish problem. Michael
McKinley, a professor of political science at the Australian
National University, maintains that "disunity and a
revulsion against the violence in both Northern Ireland and
the mainland ensured [PIRA] rejection by the majority of the
Irish [Catholic] community in Britain, who felt its standing
was endangered."36
Condemnation of the violent tactics of the IRA and PIRA
comes from the Catholic Church regularly.

The IRA was

formally condemned first in 1931 and again in 1956, and
since 1972, the condemnations have been increasingly harsh
and frequent.

The righteousness of the cause transcended

even the impassioned pleas of Pope John Paul II when he
visited Northern Ireland in 1979 and begged for the
cessation of the violence.
There is, of course, a firm lack of support from the
Protestants of the North, and in fact, the violence of the
Provos, only furthers Protestant hate and discrimination.
The Provos have demonstrated, however, that they are
organizationally sound and do not need popular support to
carry forth their tactical objectives.

One expert estimates

that the PIRA can function with as little as three percent
support from the Catholic population.37
Strategic Goals
The strategic goals of the PIRA seem fluid, shifting
with political and social change in Northern Ireland.
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Richard Clutterbuck claims that the Provisionals do not have
any detectable political ideology and are motivated solely
by nationalist aims.

One report says the objective is to

unify Ireland under a vaguely defined form of socialism;
another claims the Provos have a Marxist-Leninist bent.
Padraig O'Malley says that the campaign is an effort to get
the British troops to withdraw from Northern Ireland, so the
North can reunite with the South.

Mark Findlay argues that

the movement was a reaction not to British military pre
sence, but to blatant economic deprivation and "discrimina
tion in the provision of housing and employment" in Northern
Ireland.38
A united Ireland is not an outlandish goal for the
Provisionals.

The citizens of Britain and the Republic

consistently endorse some form of reunification.

However,

neither group is willing to make concessions to help bring
about a peacefully united Ireland.

Citizens of the Republic

are unwilling to pay higher taxes to initiate reunification,
and British citizens remain aloof, claiming that the Irish
problem should stay in Ireland.
As a matter of fact, public opinion polls have shown
that violence in Northern Ireland has little effect on
British sentiment, and violence in Britain raises only
minimal concern among the citizens.

Furthermore, even

though Ulster Protestants see themselves as British, instead
of Irish, the feeling is not necessarily reciprocated.
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Troop withdrawal is a seemingly simplistic goal of the
Provos, however some would argue to contrary.

A survey has

found that fifty-nine percent of people in the Republic
believe that troop withdrawal without the consent of both
societies in the North would result in increased violence.
Speculations have been made that a full withdrawal
would leave Northern Ireland in the hands of the
professional Protestant army and police force whose
membership would range from five to fifteen thousand.

This

scenario anticipates that Catholics would flee to the
Republic, creating an immense refugee problem.

The

Provisionals and the Official IRA would appear as protectors
and defenders of the remaining Catholics in the North.
Recruitment would skyrocket as would financial support from
the Republic, sympathizers abroad, and especiallyf Irish—
Americans.

The Republic would stand firm in their quest to

protect Catholic communities along the border and perhaps
aspire to regain all six counties of Ulster.

The North and

South in essence would be on the brink of civil war.
O'Malley maintains that withdrawal would irrevocably
strengthen the position of the IRA and that
there is, therefore, no case for unilateral withdrawal
unless, of course, it is assumes the Protestants would
accept that British withdrawal made unification
inevitable, and that rather than fight the inevitable
they would bow to it.39
The chances of the Protestants giving up without a fight is
highly unlikely.
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The only viable strategic goal remaining then is the
end of Protestant domination in employment, housing and
government in Northern Ireland—the original goal of the
protests in the late 1960s.
out of reach.

This goal too, however, may be

The process of enlightenment from religious

and social constraints and barriers is a long and arduous
process.

As seen in the United States, as well as Ireland,

the conflicts which accompany racial and religious
inequality and discrimination are numerous.

Some might say

even too numerous to comprehend, let alone solve.

Religious

divisions date back eight hundred years in Ireland.

The

walls of discrimination are built upon the solid foundations
of Protestant industrialism and Catholic agrarianism.
Religious affiliation divisions are central to political and
social polarization, perpetuating employment and income
discrimination.

Discrimination will be further analyzed and

evaluated in the next chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter was based on James Rule's statement that
"the objectives and targets of militant collective action
[will] reflect pursuit of long term collective interest of
the groups represented in the action.

The significant

feature with the PIRA is that they only have an estimated
one-third of all Catholic support in Ulster for their
strategic goals.

In 1981, the population in the North was

approximately 1,750,000 persons.

Only one-third of those
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are Catholic, roughly 580,000.

Of those 580,000 Catholics,

a mere one-third fully support the tactical and strategic
objectives of the Provos, only 19 0,000 people.
Rule's hypothesis, however, is still correct because
these 190,000 people form the group represented by the IRA
and PIRA; these are the men and women who want an immediate
withdrawal of all British troops and reunification with the
Republic.

These people support the tactical objectives of

intimidation as the only method of attaining the strategic
goals of withdrawal and reunification.

O'Malley's

contention that the group can survive with only three
percent popular support is, therefore, not outlandish.
Survival and tactical success, however, are vastly different
from strategic success.

Although the Provisionals are

tactically successful every time another bomb explodes, they
are no closer to strategic success.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCRIMINATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
There is much controversy surrounding the situation in
Northern Ireland.

One of the most controversial aspects of

the troubles falls in the realm of discrimination.

This

chapter focuses on perceived discrimination against the
Catholic minority by the Protestant majority, Northern
Ireland government and British government; however, it will
also study the Protestant viewpoint of the allegations of
discrimination.
Padraig O'Malley argues that the Protestant government
of Northern Ireland
demanded that all Catholics be viewed as subversives
and all Catholic actions interpreted in that context;
any compromise with Catholics in a political sense was
seen as potentially undermining Protestant hegemony.
The result: widespread discrimination against
Catholics, especially for jobs and housing; keeping
their numbers down by keeping their emigration up;
stereotyping; and a society that put the utmost premium
on spatial divisions that developed along close
communal lines, and in which religion became the badge
of political allegiance.1
Several authors contend that there is very little
discrimination by Protestants, and their opinions will also
be considered.

Housing discrimination will be reviewed

first, followed by employment and income discrimination, and
finally the disparity in the education system.
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Several steps have been taken to rectify the
discrimination that plagues Ulster.

Equal housing and

employment laws have been enacted, and integration is being
tested as a means to end educational disparity.

In 1976 the

Fair Employment Act made discrimination based on political
or religious beliefs illegal and created the Fair Employment
Agency (FEA).
The goal of this chapter is to study the prevalence of
discrimination in Northern Ireland.

Further, an attempt

will be made to study the reaction of the Provisional Irish
Republican Army to the perceived discrimination against the
Catholic residents.

In addition, an analysis of the

Protestant reaction to the civil rights movement of the late
1960s and early 1970s and the PIRA will be made.

It will be

proposed that the PIRA has done little to quell
discrimination against Catholics because they perpetuate the
Protestant and government notions of Catholic disloyalty and
distrust.
A major contention among those who study the situation
in Northern Ireland, and those who live in Northern Ireland
is the amount of discrimination against Catholics.

The

differences arise in assessing perceived discrimination
versus actual discrimination.

Thomas E. Hachey claims that

throughout recent history, "Ulster's Roman Catholics have
shared a plight similar to that of blacks in the United
States, as they have been routinely denied their civil
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rights and have been discriminated against in education,
housing and jobs."2

Christopher Hewitt, in "Discrimination

in Northern Ireland," argues however that although
discrimination against Catholics has occurred, "the extent
and severity of this discrimination have been greatly
exaggerated."3
This chapter examines four types of discrimination:
housing, employment, income and education.

A description of

the violations, as well as their proposed remedies, is
necessary to show that steps have been taken to end
discrimination.

The purpose is to show that efforts to end

sectarian discrimination have failed for the most part.
Bill Rolston, a Sociologist at Ulster Polytechnic,
claims that the reforms made in the 1970s may not be fully
recognized and implemented due to radical republican
ideology and rejection of the very government which enacted
those civil rights laws.4
Housing Discrimination
Before the civil rights movement of the late 1960s,
public housing was in the jurisdiction of local councils:
councils run by Protestant officials.

Twenty-six percent of

all Catholics in Ulster lived in public housing.
Northern Ireland:

In

A Report on the Conflict, written by The

London Sunday Times Insight Team, it is claimed that the
local councils discriminated against Catholics in several
ways.

One was to put Protestants in better houses than
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Catholics, but charge the same rents.

In Dungannon, for

exactly the same amount of rent, a Catholic on Ballygawley
Road estate got forty-two square feet less space than a
Protestant in the exclusive Cunningham's Lane estate.
Another tactic was simply to house more Protestants
than Catholics.

Of the 1,598 houses built by Fermenaugh

County Council between 1945 and 1969, 1,021 went to
Protestant families.

A third practice was to refuse to

house Catholics except in areas where other Catholics
already lived.

Derry before 1969 actually reduced its

housing program rather that let Catholics cross the boundary
of the Catholic South Ward.
this system as well.

Omagh and Dungannon practiced

An added feature was the strengthening

of the local electoral arrangements.

Catholics were

prevented from living in Protestant wards, thus, the system
perpetuated itself in the Protestant dominated council
system.5
Christopher Hewitt, in "Catholic Grievances, Catholic
Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the
Civil Rights Period," maintains that Protestant
discrimination against Catholics was undeniable, however,
"Catholic councils also discriminated."6

In Newry, a

Catholic governed council allocated 743 council houses to
Catholics, and only 22 to Protestants.

Awareness of such

discrimination, Hewitt claims, "was widespread among
Northern Irish Protestants."7

He claims further that
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discrimination by Protestant councils had little impact on
Catholics and that "the greatest bias appeared to lie in the
treatment of Protestants by Catholic councils."8
Table 4.—Allocation of Employment and Housing by Council
Type.
Whole Province
Caths
Prots

Prot. Coun.
Prots Caths

Cath. Coun.
Prots Caths

% living in
council homes

20.6

25.9

20.6

25.9

20.4

40.6

% working for
council

5.6

4.3

5.7

4.1

3.7

5.3

Source: Christopher Hewitt, "Catholic Grievances, Catholic
Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the
Civil Rights Period: A Reconsideration," The British
Journal of Sociology 32 (September 1981): 367, table 2.
A conventional thought is that Protestant discrimina
tion against Catholics in the area of housing was a great
catalyst for mass support of the Northern Ireland Civil
Rights Association (NICRA).

New York Times reporter Peter

Maas concluded that one of the many catalysts for the civil
rights movement was the jumping of a single, Protestant
woman over ten Catholic families in line for public
housing.9

However, when Catholics were asked if they

expected "to be treated fairly in dealing with the local
council," only ten percent of those living in Protestant
dominated council areas said they expected unfair treatment.
A similar response was received from those living in
Catholic council areas.10
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In a 1969 "new deal" package set up to reduce
discrimination, housing matters were transferred from the
local to the national authority.

That reform policy was

rejected in 1970 by the Unionist Party in Ulster.

Unionists

believed that formation of a central authority would deprive
local authorities of a voice in the building and allocation
of houses in its constituencies.

The London Times. however,

quoted the Minister of Development as saying that "the vote
would not change the Government's plans.

There would be no

going back."11
The central housing authority was officially created in
July, 197 0, by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive Bill.
This proposal created a nine-man decision-making executive
body and a council to represent the population in all parts
of Northern Ireland and report to the executive.
Although some of the housing discrimination was
alleviated, a 1973 study for the Northern Ireland Community
Relations Commission identified "twelve areas in Belfast
which [were] black spots in relation to overcrowding.
of these [were] Catholic areas."12

All

Hewitt maintains however

that overcrowding in Catholic areas is not due to
discrimination, but to "larger family size and massive
population movements after the communal rioting."13
In 1980 there were over 500 complaints made to the
Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints regarding the
Housing Executive.

Bill Rolston states that "452 cases were
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investigated, but of these a judgement of maladministration
was made in only 23 cases (5 percent)."14
Paul Arthur maintains, in "Negotiating the Northern
Ireland Problem," that in 1986, 1,118 families were driven
from their homes in the immediate aftermath of the signing
of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1985.

"Almost all [were] the

result of loyalists attacking Catholics."15
A May 27, 1988 New York Times article further outlines
the sectarian discrimination in North Belfast.

Protestant

gangs successfully prevented Catholics from occupying five
refurbished homes in the Protestant district.

Only one

Catholic family remained in the loyalist enclave.

They have

lived there for thirty-two years, and Bernhard Murphy, the
70 year old home owner said, "I'm not a fighting man, not a
bit tough, but I'm not leaving."16

The Murphy's home had

recently been the target of three fire-bombs, thrown by
angry Protestants who believed that the area belonged in
strictly Protestant hands.
It would be foolhardy to claim that there were no
attacks on Protestants who lived in Catholic-dominated
areas.

Children in both areas have been seen throwing

stones and bottles into the neighborhoods of their nemesis.
John Conroy argues that the difference that Catholic
paramilitary groups target the government and the opposing
factions of that government, while Protestant paramilitaries
target Catholic civilians as well as suspected terrorists.17
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Discrimination in housing has been largely eliminated
by the Housing Executive, and the quality of housing has
greatly improved.

However, housing discrimination has not

been totally eradicated in Northern Ireland.

The

Protestant-run Housing Executive is easily able to cover up
any discrimination because the Commissioner for Complaints
rarely finds maladministration in the cases brought to its
attention.

The loyalists in Northern Ireland do not want

Catholics living in their midst, and Catholics do not want
the Protestants within their communal boundaries.

The

twenty foot high concrete and barbed wire "peace line" that
separates the two communities in Belfast is testimony to
this phenomenon.
Job and Income Discrimination
Job and income discrepancy remains the most perceived
civil rights violation in Northern Ireland.

Jonathan Kelley

and Ian McAllister suggest that income disparity in 1968 was
due primarily to discrimination.
In 1968 a Catholic family equal in family background,
occupation and education to a Protestant family, could
have expected to receive two pounds and ten schillings
less per week. This represents only 88% of the average
Protestant family income—a real and significant
disadvantage.18
According to Denis O'Hearn in "Catholic Grievances, Catholic
Nationalism," there is "overwhelming evidence from the 1971
census that discrimination in employment was the normal
state of affairs."19

In 1970 there were only 400 Catholics
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among 10,000 workers at the Harland and Wolff shipyards, the
provinces single largest employer.

Furthermore, Catholics

"numbered only a handful in the workforces of the two major
factories located in Catholic area of Belfast—Mackies and
Sirocco Engineering Works."20

Unemployment among Catholics

in 1971 was two and one-half times that of Protestants.
Further, most Catholics are relegated to unskilled or semi
skilled labor positions, while Protestants are employed in
skilled labor, managerial, and government positions.
Christopher Hewitt writes that "one genuine economic
grievance of the Catholics was, and is, their higher rate of
unemployment.1121

He argues however, that economic

differences between Catholics and Protestants are not
necessarily an indication of discrimination, but instead are
due to the differences in education received by Protestants
and Catholics in Ulster.
Joseph Lee, in Ireland 1912-1985. observes that in the
late 1960s and early 1970s Catholics became more aware of
the occupational discrimination facing them, especially in
the civil service.

However, he concurs with Hewitt when he

states that "Catholic perceptions of discrimination were no
doubt exaggerated.

But the reality was bad enough."22

In

the civil service in 1972 approximately 95% of senior
officials were Protestants and only one Catholic had risen
through the ranks to hold the position of Secretary of a
Department.23

Hewitt maintains also that most
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discrimination was practiced in the area of government
employment.

He justifies this discrimination by stating

that "since a sizeable section of the Catholic community
opposed the very existence of the Northern Irish state it is
hardly surprising that they were denied government
employment."24
Hewitt also maintains that Catholics and Protestants
are in different sectors of the economy and different kinds
of occupations.

"In and of themselves," he states, "[these

differences] are not proof of discrimination (unless one
wishes to argue that the remarkable over-representation of
Catholic publicans is a sign of anti-Protestant bias in the
liquor trade?)"25
It is exactly this sort of flip attitude that gives
rise to continued sectsirisn differences snd fuirtheirs
disparities in Northern Ireland.

Unfortunately this

attitude often prevails, and Catholics are regarded as
lower-class people who would rather sit in a pub all day
than go to work.

One rarely hears of the "Catholic work-

ethic," but we are constantly inundated with the idea of the
"Protestant work-ethic."

Many would argue however, that

there is little difference in the attitude toward hard work
between Catholics and Protestants.
Michael Hout, in a paper entitled, "Opportunity and the
Minority Middle Class:

A Comparison of Blacks in the United

States and Catholics in Northern Ireland," studies the 1971
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United Kingdom census and the 1974 Office of Population
Consensus and Survey in Northern Ireland to get a clear
picture of the extent of discrimination in the region.

He

concludes that the differences between Catholics and
Protestants are very clearly divided between community and
big business.
Catholics are underrepresented in professional
occupations relative to the representation enjoyed by
Protestants.

Furthermore, Catholics are overrepresented at

the bottom of the socioeconomec hierarchy, especially in the
laborer category.

The concentration of Catholics exceedes

that of Protestants by more than one percentage point in
acting, nursing, teaching and the clergy.

Protestants, on

the other hand, are more likely to work in the fields of
drafting, engineering and accounting.
While Protestants dominate among the managers in mining
and production, Catholics are concentrated in the ownership
of retail shops, bars and inns.

Within the skilled manual

labor category, Protestants dominate as millwrights, fitters
and machine erectors, as well as supervisory positions.
Hout contends that shipbuilding is the most important heavy
industry in Northern Ireland and Protestants have long
dominated the workforce.

The service industry is heavily

dominated by Catholics in the positions of hairdressers,
bartenders and cooks, while police and security guards are
predominately Protestant.26
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Table 5.—Selected Occupations that Contribute to
Dissimilarity Within Major Occupational Groups by
Ascriptive Group (Entries are percentages within the
major occupational group.)
Occupation

Catholic

Protestant

Professionals and Technicians
Accountants
Actors, Stage Managers,
Entertainers, Musicians
Clergymen
Draftsmen
Engineers
Nurses
Primary and Secondary School
Teachers

32.4

19.4

Managers, Owners, and Proprietors
Managers, mining and production
Proprietors and Managers, retail
Managers, other
Publicans, Innkeepers

5.1
44.1
5.5
16. 3

12.2
38. 1
13.6
1.8

11.1

15.5

9.9

19.2

Craftsmen and Foremen
Foreman, manual
Millwrights and Fitters, Machine
Erectors
Service Workers
Bartenders
Cook
Hairdressers
Police, Constables
Security Guards

2.9

4.4

1.9
8.1
3

.7
5.8
7.5
10.9
2.3

2

8

22.0
7.9
6
7
14.8

4
2
2
28

24

Source: Michael Hout, "Opportunity and the Minority Middle
Class: A Comparison of Blacks in the United States and
Catholics in Northern Ireland," American Sociological Review
51 (April 1986): 218, table 2.
Hout argues that these data
disclose something about the process stratifying the
minority groups. It shows how the existence of
segregation gives rise to ecological niches conductive
to the growth of ethnic specialties in employment.27
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Denis O'Hearn in "Again on Discrimination in the North
of Ireland," states that while Protestants hold managerial
and professional positions that serve the community as a
whole, Catholics tend to serve their own community.
Furthermore, 56% of non-managerial jobs held by Catholics
are filled by women who are nurses, teachers, shop-clerks,
or waitresses.

These jobs offer little advancement and the

women tend to quit when they marry.

O'Hearn continues,

Even within an occupation, such as dock-workers, we
find Protestants employed in cross-channel docks where
there is more work and better pay, while Catholics are
forced to work in the deep sea docks, where
occupational conditions and status are much lower.28
Income disparity is also quite prevalent in Ulster.

A

study done by Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister shows that
in 1968 the average Catholic family equal in family
background, occupation and education to a Protestant family
received two pounds and ten schillings less per week.
"These differences in incomes could be interpreted as the
direct result of religious discrimination against Catholics,
with Catholics simply being paid less than Protestants in
the same jobs."29
The London Sunday Times Insight Team state that in
Londonderry in 1966 the heads of all City Council
departments were Protectant.

Furthermore, "of 177 salaried

employees, 145 - earning a total of 124,424 pounds per
year - were Protestant, and only 32 - earning a total of
20,420 pounds per year - were Catholic."

On average in the

85

Derry City Council Protestants earned 858 pounds per year,
Catholics earned 638 pounds.30
David E. Schmitt, a political science professor at
Northeastern University, reports that in 1976, a British
Minister for Northern Ireland said that job discrimination
"is a very large problem indeed, and let nobody think
otherwise.1,31

In 1976 the Fair Employment Act made

discrimination on the grounds of religious or political
belief illegal and established the Fair Employment Agency .
The FEA was developed on the premise that its tasks
would include the investigation of individual complaints of
discrimination and the investigation of the practices of
specific organizations and employers.

Unfortunately, many

discrimination claims are never reported.

Those who

contemplate fxlxng claxxns often do not for fear of reprxsals
or because they believe nothing will be done.

Of those

reported, many are not investigated because they fall
outside the FEA's jurisdiction, or they lack evidence to
warrant investigation.

Of those complaintants deemed to

have a prima facie case of discrimination, many do not last
the course of the filing process because the bureaucratic
hurdles are too many, a fact which the FEA itself
acknowledges.
Qualitative questions add further burden of proof to
discrimination claims:

how is one to judge whether

discrimination has occurred or not, and if the motive was
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based on religious or political bias?

Bill Rolston concedes

that "as a result of these quantitative and qualitative
factors, very few findings of unlawful discrimination have
been made by the FEA."32
Table 6.—Complaints on Which Decisions have been taken by
the FEA, April 1, 1977 to March 31, 1982 (Source FEA
Annual Reports)
Organization or Employer

Discrimination

Government Departments
Local Authorities
Education and Library
Boards
Health and Social Services
Boards
Other Public Boards
Food, Drink and Tobacco
Industry
Chemical and Allied Industries
Engineering Industries
Textiles and Clothing
Manufacturing Industries
Construction Industries
Transport
Distributive Trades
Other Businesses
Total

No Discrimination

0
6

24
9

0

16

2
0

15
14

1
1
0
1

12
12
13
8
g
6
2
9
8
144

2
0
0
0
13

Source: Bill Rolston, "Reformism and Sectarianism: The
State of the Union after Civil Rights," chap, in Northern
Ireland: The Background to the Conflict, ed. John Darby
(Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983) 205, table 9:1.
Even when respondents are found guilty of
discrimination and are required to pay compensation, they
frequently do not, and the FEA is forced to bring them to
court for the money.

"As a result," Rolston reports, "only

one of the cases where a finding of discrimination has been
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upheld has to date led to compensation in the complainant's
hand."33
In 1989 unemployment was two and one-half times higher
among Catholics than Protestants.

However outside sources

have begun to intervene in the cause of the minorities.

The

Economist reported in 1989 that an effective lobby in
America is working to convince parent companies with
subsidiaries in Northern Ireland that they often perpetuate
discrimination.

This lobby has persuaded six American state

legislatures to sign the MacBride Principles.

These

principles commit any firms in which those states have
invested money to agree to a much stricter affirmative
action program.
An industrial venture in Belfast by a French firm,
Montupet, had raised many hopes for Catholic employment.

In

parts of west Belfast, where the plant is located, Catholic
unemployment ranges from sixty percent to eighty percent.
Montupet officials claim the plant will employ over 1,000
workers within five years.

This number is small compared

with the Protestant dominated shipbuilders, Harland and
Wolff.

In addition the Montupet cylinder-head project will

not produce comparable skills for Catholics, however it may
help to remove the employment differential.34
Few will dispute that employment discrimination is
prevalent in Northern Ireland.

The extent of that

discrimination however is in contention.

Hewitt and Lee
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argue that Catholics have overexaggerated discrimination,
while O'Hearn, Schmitt, and Kelley and McAllister contend
there is rampant discrimination in many employment sectors,
extending into obvious income disparities.

As Bill Rolston

pointed out, the Federal Employment Agency, an arm of the
Protestant-dominated government, has done little to help
Catholics who file discrimination charges.

Christopher

Hewitt's claim that discrimination in the government sector
is "hardly surprising" given Catholic animosity toward the
government is where the heart of the Irish troubles lie.
Catholics cannot trust a government that still blatantly
discriminates against them in the areas of employment and
income, and the government cannot trust a people who hold
such arduous and militant Nationalist ideals.
Education Discrimination
Education is often an area where scholars look for
discrimination within a community.
two parts:

This section consists of

segregation and discrimination.

Dominic Murray

suggests that segregation reflects societal differences in
Northern Ireland rather than creates them.

Jonathan Kelley

and Ian McAllister argue that segregation within the educa
tion system does not necessarily reflect discrimination.
Segregation
The primary and secondary schools in Northern Ireland
are segregated along religious lines.

Protestant children
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attend State Schools which reflect the teaching of the
Anglican church, while Catholic children attend schools
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.

There are many

important symbolic differences between the two schools which
perpetuate segregation.
schools.

The Union Jack flies over all state

Dominic Murray in "Schools and Conflict," cites a

general reaction from staff in an adjoining Catholic school:
They fly the flag down there to show that they are more
British than the British themselves. It's also to let
us know that they are the lords and masters and that we
(Catholics) should be continually aware of it.35
A study of the syllabi shows that Protestant schools
focus almost exclusively on British material, while Catholic
schools emphasize Irish studies and culture.

A case study

by A. Robinson in 1971 demonstrates the varying perceptions
produced by this education system.

Sixty-two percent of

Catholic children named either John Hume or Bishop Farren as
Derry's most important citizen, while 77% of Protestant
children named the Lord Mayor of Derry or Northern Ireland's
Prime Minister.

When asked to name the capital city of the

country in which Derry was located, more than half the
Catholic children named Dublin, while more than two-thirds
of the Protestant pupils named Belfast.

It is erroneous to

attribute these variances to the school experiences alone.
Robinson concludes however, that the schools do little to
moderate them.

A study by J. Russell in 1972 demonstrates a

greater likelihood for Catholic children to exhibit negative
attitudes towards the government.

However, it is again
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difficult to assess the amount of responsibility to be taken
by the schools for the formation of these attitudes.36
These differences extend to the sports fields as well.
Most Catholic schools support Irish games such as hurling,
Camogie, or Gaelic football and avoid British games like
hockey, cricket, or rugby.

By contrast, no Protestant

schools play any Gaelic games.
neutral.

Other sports appear to be

However, the cultural difference is clear, and

cricket, as the archetypical British sport is totally
excluded from all Catholic schools.37
Murray argues that these differences in the school
systems may promote broader community divisions.
The problem with segregated schools, with regard to
community divisions, lies not predominately in the fact
that they reflect different cultures but rather in the
meanings which are attributed by observers to the overt
demonstrations of such cultural affiliation.38
Catholics view the flying of the Union Jack as offensive,
while Protestants find the Catholic symbols adorning their
schools just as annoying.

One Protestant teacher described

a Catholic school this way:
We play St. Judes' often in games and visit their
school regularly. I never fail to be impressed by the
plethora of religious pictures and icons staring at you
around every corner. It's hard to escape the view that
a special show is being put on for our benefit....
This doesn't just apply to St. Jude's of course, but
they must know that these are the very things that we
object to, yet still they are flaunted everywhere.39
As demonstrated above, these two cultures are so
mutually antipathetic that any demonstration by one is
perceived as an assault by the other.

Murray contends that
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"the actual existence of segregation had less influence on
community division than have the meanings which are
attributed to it by members of that community."40
Christopher Hewitt strongly believes that one's
occupational status can be traced to one's education.

He

suggests that the education provided by Catholic schools is
inferior to that of State schools.

However, he states that

segregation lies with the Catholics, for they were not
refused admittance into State schools, but chose to attend
Catholic-run schools instead.41
Discrimination
Jonathan Kelley and Ian McAllister argue that Catholics
receive an average of six months less full-time schooling
than Protestants.

Furthermore, those Catholic children who

come from higher-status families receive less education than
a Protestant child of the same status.

For instance, if the

father of a Catholic child held a managerial position, the
child could expect to receive slightly under eleven years of
full-time schooling, but the child of a Protestant who held
the same status job could expect to receive thirteen years
of education, a gap of two years.

Although higher-status

Catholics are at an obvious disadvantage compared to higher
status Protestants, Kelley and McAllister note that "the
disparities cannot be attributed to discrimination in
education, since the educational system in Northern Ireland
is rigidly segregated."42
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Conclusion
A conclusion can be drawn that there is no discrim
ination in the educational system in Northern Ireland.
Segregation is not always synonymous with discrimination.
There is little evidence that an education from a
Protestant-state school is any better or worse academically
than a Catholic school.

The two schools offer material

which is historically and culturally significant to its
students.

This difference in education does not necessarily

promote discrimination and is, in reality, a reflection of a
divided society, not a cause of a divided society.
There are those people, an idealistic few, in Northern
Ireland who seek to end segregation.

The Economist reports

that by 1988 there were only seven mixed-religion schools,
teaching a total of 1.000 pupils, or 0,3% of the school
population.

This is modest progress, but it was achieved

against strong odds.

These schools must start privately and

run for two years before getting financial support from the
government.43

Dominic Murray states that only those people

already sympathetic to the idea of integration will support
the mixed-religion schools.

Furthermore, "when structural

change precedes attitudinal change, it is probable that any
impact will be restricted to within that structure only."44
Therefore, it is unlikely that the concept of integrated
schools will be widely accepted among either group in
Northern Ireland.
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IRA Reaction to Perceived Discrimination
The present PIRA movement began on the streets in 19681969 as a non-sectarian, non-violent campaign of political
education and activism.

"Civil rights was an obvious

rallying point for all Catholic dissidents, but although the
republican movement was heavily involved in the formation of
the NICRA in 1967, it chose to stay out of the limelight,"
states Barry White in "From Conflict to Violence.1,45
Nevertheless, by 1968 the PIRA was at the forefront of the
movement and therefore involved in the decision-making
process.

Although the NICRA moderates had called a truce

acknowledging government reforms, White explains, "others
were ready to test Protestant patience to destruction."46
In January, 1969, the Peoples Democracy March from Belfast
to Derry was ambushed by the "B" Specials, a group of
Protestant police reservists.

They attacked the student and

republican marchers causing numerous injuries and sparking
several days and nights of rioting in Derry and Newry.
By concentrating on their goal of non-violent political
education and activism, the IRA had left itself defenseless
against increasing Loyalist attack.

Radical leftists

appealed to the South for weapons to repel Loyalist
incursions, and capitalizing on sympathy for their Catholic
neighbors to the North, money and weapons flowed from the
Republic into the violent wing now called the Provisional
IRA.
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The British Army was called into Northern Ireland in
1969 to quell rioting between the two communities.

As

housing and other reforms were created by the government
however, the PIRA shifted its attention from civil rights
toward the Ulster Defense Regiment and the British soldiers.
Ironically, the first soldier died in February, 1971, seven
months after the implementation of the Northern Ireland
Housing Executive Bill.

The non-violent activism had

quickly turned into bloodshed.

The campaign rapidly

escalated as on-duty as well as off-duty soldiers and
policemen were killed and bombs were extensively used to
intimidate Protestant civilians.

White maintains that

One of these, involving the bombing of a Protestant pub
on the Shankill Road [in Belfast], marked the beginning
of an openly sectarian campaign, and the Official IRA
denounced [the Provisionals] "as fiendish and sectarian
bigots, whose motives are obviously to set the
Protestant and Catholic working class at each others
throats".47
Protestant Reaction to the Civil Rights Movement
and the PIRA
The majority of Protestants were very hostile to the
civil rights movement.

Christopher Hewitt claims that

"Protestant hostility to the civil rights movement was
undeniably based upon the belief that the movement was the
old Catholic enemy in new clothes, summed up by the graffiti
slogan CRA=IRA."48

Protestants further believed that the

NICRA was not pursuing civil rights, but pursuing
nationalism and the unity of Ireland.

Hewitt argues that
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these goals were attributed to the IRA influence in the
NICRA and that IRA members played a significant role as
stewards at meetings.
The greatest Protestant fear is that Catholics in
Northern Ireland will gain control of the government and
unite with the Republic.

The Times Insight Team reports

that as early as 1954, Protestant Members of Parliament were
proclaiming that "the government must ask themselves whether
it were safe to employ in government service people who
openly advocate treason."49
When rising nationalism threatened a merger between the
North and South, the Protestant wisdom was Unionism:
continued coalescence with Britain to maintain the status
quo and forestall union with the Catholic Republic.
As the NICRA gained momentum and the government began
making concessions to their demands for better housing and
employment equality, Protestant radicals became agitated and
started taunting, throwing stones at, and beating marchers.
The police often did nothing to stop this violence, and when
the marchers retaliated, the police clubbed and arrested
them.
By 1972, the PIRA had taken full control of Catholic
areas in Derry and Belfast and waged a war with Protestant
paramilitaries, police, and government officials.

At this

stage the violence turned openly sectarian, with Protestants
reacting to the Republican threat in what Barry White calls,
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"the traditional manner—spreading terror among IRA
sympathizers by gunning down innocent Catholics in the
street."50
The Protestant paramilitary counterpart to the PIRA is
the Ulster Defense Force (UDF), created in 1970 in the
Shankill, Dublin.

As membership grew to 15,000 the violence

in Northern Ireland soared from 174 dead in 1971 to 468 in
1972.

The mission of the UDF was to protect Protestants

from Catholic violence, maintain the Protestant-dominated
government, and destroy the insurgents of the PIRA and their
sympathizers.
Conclusion
Discrimination is often blamed for the troubles in
Northern Ireland.

It has been suggested here that housing,

employment, and income discrimination were rampant in Ulster
before the Civil Rights movement of 1969.
Housing and employment discrimination was not only
practiced by Protestants however, but by Catholics as well.
Christopher Hewitt maintains that if the NICRA had truly
non-sectarian orientations, it would have condemned
discrimination by Catholic councils and businesses.
Instead, he claims, Protestants in Newry were subjected to
"the hipocracy of a civil rights march which ignored the
sectarian policies of the Nationalist Council."51
Protestant suspicions of Republican intervention and
leadership in the NICRA were confirmed at the very first
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civil rights march where a Nationalist MP and a Republican
Labour MP led the march and made speeches.

Further, the

bands played "Who Fears to Speak of '98," an anti-British
ballad, and at the close of the March the crowd sang "A
Nation Once Again," the anthem of Irish Republicanism.
These moves demonstrate visible and blatant links between
the civil rights movement and the IRA.

Protestant hostility

toward the movement grew from these demonstrations of
nationalism.
Supposedly the civil rights movement demanded reforms.
Yet the violence escalated after reforms were made.

Hewitt

argues that there are two reasons for this:
First since the old system was not particularly
inequitable, reforms could not have much impact, second
the nationalists who predominated in the movement were
not really interested in reforms.52
The movement was advertised as non-sectarian.

At its

roots that may have been the case, but very quickly it
became sectarian and nationalist.

The demands made by the

civil rights association for equal housing, employment, and
income have been met to a degree, but Bill Rolston maintains
that
if reforms are not operating as fully or successfully
as they might, that is due in large part to the
continuing irredentist claims of reactionary
nationalists and the Left Republicans who tail-end
them.53
The PIRA, through its use of violence has turned a
civil rights movement into a war of attrition by inciting
Protestant hostility from the very beginning of the

movement.

if
In Fermenaugh, in 1969, Catholics were a

majority, but were denied housing, representation in county
councils, and employment.

Instead of turning to violence

however, Catholics showed their tenacity peacefully, using
their majority in Parliamentary elections to vote in
maverick MP's.

John Conroy argues that in 1979 "peace was

undermined by an IRA campaign."54

The Provos had been

assassinating members of the national guard and police in
the area since 1971, but in 1979 that number escalated and
for a nine-month period, the area had the highest murder
rate in Northern Ireland.

Almost every Protestant family

had someone in the security forces, and although they did
not blame the Catholics in the immediate neighborhood, one
Protestant stated, "If there's going to be a civil war, its
going to start in Fermenaugh."55
It is undeniable that the Provisional Irish Republican
Army is responsible for maintaining Protestant hostility and
perpetuating their claims of Catholic disloyalty and
distrust.

Since the PIRA is supposedly the mouth of the

Catholic minority, and the PIRA refuses to recognize the
legitimacy of the government, Rolston's claims that the
Provos undermine any further civil rights reforms has
considerable validity.

It is hardly surprising that the

government will not alienate its Protestant majority by
making further reforms for Catholics who largely reject
unionist ideology, the basis of the Northern Ireland
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government, in favor of nationalism and reunification with
the Republic.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
As this thesis nears the end, a reiteration of the
original intent is necessary.

The purpose was an historical

approach to explaining the situation in Northern Ireland.
It started in 1858, although the conflict dates back much
further, and progressed through 1991.

An attempt was made

to explain the role the Provisional Irish Republican Army in
the conflict since 1968 and to assess their role in
attaining peace in the region.
Perceived discrimination against Catholics by
Protestants and the Ulster government was a large part of
this thesis.

It was offered that there was undoubtedly

discrimination against Catholics in the areas of housing and
employment, but merely segregation in the area of education.
To a large degree discrimination has been eradicated,
unfortunately however, there are still employment and income
disparities in Ulster.

It was argued that terrorism is

counter-productive in the elimination of discrimination in
Northern Ireland because it promotes Protestant and
government stereotypes of Catholic disloyalty and distrust.
It seems that many people who speak about the situation
in Northern Ireland have either one of two opinions toward
104
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those involved in the violence.

Either they blame the

Catholics or they blame the Protestants.
more complicated.

However it is much

As discussed in the introduction,

religion itself has very little to do with the violence.
Religious affiliation however, is a main key.
Throughout the conflict, one's religion has been a
symbol of status and power.

It has dictated where one

lives, goes to school and works.

Religious affiliation is

strongly present in social clubs and political
organizations.

It dominates the lives of all who live in

Northern Ireland because, simply stated, it marks
Protestants as oppressers, Catholics as terrorists, and all
who live in Ulster as potential targets.
Unfortunately, terrorism is perpetrated not only by the
Provos, but by the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster
Defense Association as well.

Thomas Hachey in "A Courtship

with Terrorism," states that the failure of Northern Ireland
authorities to
protect their Catholic citizens from Protestant
militants bent on revenge for IRA outrages has prompted
such Catholics to welcome help from anyone who would
provide it. Very often it has been the Provos who have
accommodated that need.1
The lack of support and Protection for Catholics led to
the rise of the Provisionals in the late 1960s and early
1970s.

The strategic goals of the PIRA in the 1970s were

the end of discrimination against Catholics in the areas of
housing, employment, and education, reunification with the
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Republic of Ireland and subsequent Parliamentary rule, and
removal of occupying British forces in Northern Ireland.
The tactical goals of the Provos have been many.

Bombings,

assassinations, and harassment have been the mainstay of
tactical success for more than twenty years.

The

Provisionals run their terrorist machine effectively and
forcefully.

The organization is tight and its members

focused.
It is probable however, that their strategic goals will
not be met.

Ironically, it is their tactical success that

will forever keep Northern Ireland and the Republic
separated.

Desmond O'Malley, Minister of Justice in the

Fianna Fail (the largest political party in the South)
government, speaking to the Emerald Association in New York
in October 1972 said:
The major damage done by the IRA violence is, of
course, the damage it does to the prospects for a
reconciliation between the two traditions in the North.
Another major tragedy is what it is doing to the
children and adolescents of the stricken cities of
Belfast and Derry, young people whose minds cannot but
be seared for a generation to come. The damage to the
minds of a generation of young people is almost too
terrible to bear thinking about.2
In the beginning of the latest conflict the
achievements of the NICRA and the Provisionals were
considerable.

The NICRA had convinced the government,

largely through peaceful demonstrations, to implement anti
discrimination measures.

The demonstrations resulted in the

housing reforms in 1970, and, to a degree, the Fair
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Employment Act of 1975.

The Provos had unchallenged control

of the urban Catholic ghettos in 1971 and 1972.

Richard

Clutterbuck maintains that their tactical guerrilla strategy

3td& rYi& r -n

provided an overreaction by Storemont "which induced the
British Government in March 1972 to bring fifty years of
discriminatory Protestant rule to an end."3
Instead of turning this success into political
opportunity and negotiating with the British to meet their
goals, the Provos chose to further their attacks on
government officials and began a clandestine war with the
British security forces.

"Having no political philosophy,"

Clutterbuck says, "they were unable to take advantage of the
political opportunity they themselves had created."4

The

violence of the PIRA unequivicably curbed any progress that
was being made through civil right reforms in Ulster.
Throughout Irish history there are instances where
legitimate movements and organizations have achieved
political and social success.

Disestablishment of the Irish

Protestant Church in 1866, implementation of the Land Bill
in 1870, and government cooperation with the Official Land
League created the Land Act of 1881.

Additionally, Home

Rule was legislated for Ireland in 1910, and the Irish Free
State was created in 1914.

Due to the moderate ideology of

Sinn Fein at the time, their political popularity grew and
they won considerable victories in the elections of 1920 and
1922.

108

Through the years we can trace the popular support of
the Republican movement with social change and increased
violence.

All of the aforementioned achievements were

accomplished through legitimate, cooperative measures, not
violence and civil disobedience.

It is a fact that as

violence increased in the Republic during those tumultuous
years, popular support for the violent organization waned.
The Easter Rising of 1916 was not popularly supported and
did very little to help the cause of Home Rule.

It seems

that this factor is a constant throughout all of Irish
history.
In the early 1970s support for the NICRA was high among
Catholics in both the North and South, and sympathizers in
Britain and America.

All wanted to see housing and

employment discrimination come to an end.

Since this was

the main demand of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association, which had a significant IRA membership,
demonstrations and violence should have stopped when housing
reforms were made in 1971 and the Fair Employment Act was
passed in 1976.
By that time however, the goals of the IRA and PIRA had
significantly changed.

The fluidity of the Provisionals'

ideology made it possible for them to expand on the ideals
of the NICRA and further the cause of freedom and reunifica
tion.

The governments of Northern Ireland and Britain,

however, were not as flexible.

They met the original
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demands to end discrimination, but would go no further.
The IRA failed to recognize the success that had been
gained through the mass demonstration in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.

As they turned to more violent methods of

communication with the government, the security forces and
the Protestant population retaliated.

Paul Arthur states

that
in a conflict where more than 55 percent of the victims
have been innocent civilians, republican paramilitaries
may have managed singlehandedly to have redefined the
Northern Ireland problem as one of terrorism rather
than of rights.5
When the Provos moved their fight from the arena of
discrimination to freedom from British rule and
reunification with the Republic, many Protestants who had
supported the original cause withdrew their support and grew
leery of the organization.

As violence worsened in the

1970s and 1980s, Catholics in the North, South, Britain and
the international community felt disgust toward the PIRA.
This attitude is evident in the dwindling military supplies
and money being sent to the Provos, and the lack of ballots
being cast for Sinn Fein.
Not only will the lack of popular support for the PIRA
keep them from attaining their strategic goals, but so will
Protestant and government hostility.

The unfortunate factor

in this instance is that this hostility is directed not only
at PIRA members, but toward the Catholic community as a
whole.

Even during the civil rights marches, Protestants
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viewed the movement as a mere front for subversive
republican activities.

At the time English journalists

deemed them as paranoid bigots who wanted to perpetuate
Catholic oppression.

Although the movement professed to be

purely civil rights oriented, it was clear from the
beginning that there were republican undertones and
motivations.
It was the consequent actions of the IRA at civil
rights gatherings that confirmed Protestant and government
suspicions of IRA infiltration and activity.

These actions

(the singing of republican songs and the flying of the Irish
tricolor) caused already leery Protestants to view the
entire civil rights movement with disdain and loathing.
Christopher Hewitt maintains that
any intelligent Catholic leader would know that a
movement with such conspicuous nationalist and
Republican connections would alienate moderate
Protestant support and provoke sectarian violence. The
handful of Protestants involved in the early stages of
the civil rights movement quickly dropped out, making a
mockery of the NICRA's pretensions to be a nonsectarian movement.6
Given the history between Catholics and Protestants it
is no wonder that Protestants rejected the civil rights
movement when they learned of the IRA penetration and
influence.

As the movement openly changed from civil rights

to reunification and grew more violent, that brutality was
reciprocated in a more insidious way.

While the PIRA

primarily target government officials and security forces,
the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer
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Force attack Catholic civilians they deem disloyal.

Conor

Cruise O'Brien has observed that the effect of the effort of
the Provos to protect Catholics and fight for independence
and reunification has been to
raise the level of sectarian consciousness. They have
encouraged the Catholics and helped them to win
important and long-overdue reforms. They have
frightened and angered Protestants and if their efforts
could be continued on the same lines and with the same
kind of success, they would bring the people of the
province and island sectarian civil war. And in fact,
even at present, language and gestures which are
subjectively revolutionary but have appeal only within
one sectarian community, are objectively language and
gestures of sectarian civil war."7
There can be no peace with the Provisional Irish
Republican Army.

They have reiterated many times that they

will keep fighting for their goals at all costs.

The

Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher and John Major
have steadfastly held onto Northern Ireland and maintain
security forces in the region.

In the unlikely event that

the troops are pulled from the region, full-scale civil war
would ensue:

Protestants against Catholics, both fighting

to preserve their land and heritage.

Padraig O'Malley is

confident that
the Provisionals have settled in for the long haul with
the means and the resources to sustain the protracted
campaign it entails, secure in the knowledge that a
majority of Catholics, both North and South, do not
regard their actions as merely criminal. So long as
the Catholic ghettos exist, they will not want for
recruits. So long as they have martyrs, they will not
want for a sense of historical continuity. So long as
the prison culture prevails, they will no want for the
propaganda of repression. And so long as the fear of a
Protestant backlash lurks in the collective conscious
ness of the minority they will not be abandoned.®
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These are the hopes of the Provisionals.

They are

counting on violent Protestant and government reactions to
their campaign of terror.

As long as there is retaliation

and continued opression of Catholics in Northern Ireland,
the Provisional Irish Republican Army will have enough
popular support to maintain their campaign and fight for a
united Ireland.
There can be no peace without negotiation, and no
negotiation until the Provisionals put their weapons down.
History has shown that violence is counter-productive and
the only way to achieve equality is through verbal
communication and dialogue with the British government.
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